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1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
In the next generation of wireless communication systems, there will be a need for the rapid
deployment of independent mobile users. Examples include establishing survivable, efficient,
dynamic communication for emergency/rescue operations, disaster relief efforts, and military
networks. The mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of independent mobile nodes
that communicate without a preexisting infrastructure which meets these requirements [1].
Since MANETs are decentralized environments, it comes out the idea of the devices in the
network to be collaborative and help each other to better accomplish a common task with
high performance such as quality, throughput, etc. Cooperative communications have recently
become a key approach in realizing this idea [7].
The cooperative relaying approach has a great potential to provide substantial benefits in
terms of reliability (diversity gain) [5]-[8] and rate (bandwidth or spectral efficiency)[9]-[12].
These benefits can extend the coverage, reduce network energy consumption, and promote
uniform energy drainage by exploiting neighbors’ resources. They can be of great value in
many applications, including ad-hoc networks, mesh networks, and next generation wireless
local area networks and cellular networks.
1.1 Cooperative Relaying
Figure 1.1 shows a wireless relay network composed of single source, single relay, and single
destination. In this network, the transmission occurs in two phases. In the first phase, the
source sends its message to the destination. Because of the broadcast nature of the wireless
channel, the relay hears the first phase transmission. In the second phase, the relay assists the
source by forwarding the received signal to the destination. In order to decode the source’s
2Destination
Source
Relay
First Phase
Second phase
Figure 1.1 Single source, single relay, and single destination wireless net-
work.
message, the destination combines the signals received from the source and the relay.
1.1.1 Cooperative diversity and cooperative spatial multiplexing
Cooperative diversity (C-DIV) is an approach that exploits the broadcast nature and in-
herent spatial diversity of the channel. Through cooperative diversity, relay nodes forward the
signal received from the source to propagate redundant signals over multiple paths in the net-
work. This redundancy allows the ultimate receiver to essentially average channel variations
resulting from fading, shadowing, and other forms of interference [5].
Cooperative spatial multiplexing (C-SM) is another cooperative relaying architecture which
simplifies the transmit and receive processing requirement on the relay node while providing
significant savings in the transmit and receive energy over the C-DIV technique, particularly
in the high spectral efficiency regime [9]. The idea of this approach is to make each relay node
detects only a subset (called sub-stream) of the source data stream and all relay nodes forward
3their sub-streams simultaneously over the same physical channel. Then, multiple receive an-
tennas at the base station (destination) allow the sub-streams to be detected separately based
on their spatial characteristics.
1.1.2 Cooperation protocols
Several cooperation protocols have been proposed in the literature to achieve different tasks.
Examples of these protocols can be explained as follow:
1.1.2.1 Amplify-and forward (AF) [5]
The transmission of the symbol x in AF scheme occurs in two phases or two time slots.
In the first phase, the source sends x to the destination. because of the broadcast nature of
the wireless channel the transmission of the first phase can be heard by the relay node. In
the second phase, the relay amplifies the signal received from the source and forward it to the
destination. The signal received at the relay in the first phase is given by
yr = hsrx+ nr (1.1)
where hsr is the gain channel of the channel between the source and the relay, nr is an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance N0. The signal transmitted by
the relay node is given by
xr =βyr
=βhsrx+ βnr (1.2)
where β is the amplifying gain. To remain within its power constraint (with high probability),
an amplifying relay must use gain
β =
√
P
|hsr|2P +N0 (1.3)
where the amplifier gain is allowed to depend upon the fading coefficient hsr between the
source and relay, which the relay estimates to high accuracy. This scheme can be viewed as
4repetition coding from two separate transmitters, except that the relay transmitter amplifies
its own receiver noise.
The signal received at the destination in the first phase is given by
yd1 = hsdx+ nd1 (1.4)
where hsd is the gain channel of the channel between the source and the destination, nd1 is an
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance N0. The signal received
at the destination in the second phase is given by
yd2 = hrdβhsrx+ hrdβnr + nd2 (1.5)
where hrd is the gain channel of the channel between the relay and the destination, nd2 is an
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance N0. The destination can
decode its received signal by first appropriately combining the signals yd1 and yd2 using one of
a variety of combining techniques such as maximum-ratio combiner.
1.1.2.2 Decode-and forward (DF)
The first phase of the DF scheme is similar to that of the AF scheme. In the second phase
of the DF scheme, the relay nodes decodes the received signal first to fins an estimate of the
transmitted symbol xˆ and then forward the decoded symbol to the destination. The signal
transmitted by the relay node is given by
xr = xˆ (1.6)
and the signal received at the destination in the second phase is given by
yd2 = hrdxˆ+ nd2 (1.7)
Decoding at the relay can take on a variety of forms. For example, the relay might fully
decode, i.e., estimate without error, the entire source codeword, or it might employ symbol-
by-symbol decoding and allow the destination to perform full decoding. These options allow
for trading off performance and complexity at the relay terminal.
51.1.2.3 Compress-and-forward (CF) [13, 14]
Compress and forward is another example of cooperation protocols which allows the relay
nodes to compress the received signal from the source node and forward it to the destination
without decoding the signal where Wyner-Ziv coding can be used for optimal compression.
1.1.2.4 Selection Relaying
since the fading coefficients are known to the appropriate receivers, hsr can be measured
to high accuracy by the cooperating terminals; thus, they can adapt their transmission format
according to the realized value of hsr. This observation suggests the following class of selection
relaying algorithms If the measured |hsr|2 falls below a certain threshold, the source simply
continues its transmission to the destination, in the form of repetition or more powerful codes.
If the measured |hsr|2 lies above the threshold, the relay forwards what it received from the
source, using either amplify-and-forward or decode-and-forward, in an attempt to achieve
diversity gain.
Informally speaking, selection relaying of this form should offer diversity because, in either
case, two of the fading coefficients must be small in order for the information to be lost.
Specifically, if |hsr|2 is small, then |hsd|2 must also be small for the information to be lost when
the source continues its transmission. Similarly, if |hsr|2 is large, then both |hsd|2 and |hrd|2
must be small for the information to be lost when the relay employs amplify-and-forward or
decode-and-forward.
1.1.3 Multiple access relay networks
Figure 1.2 shows an example of mutiple access relay network. In multiple-access relay
network (MARN), multiple sources communicate with a single destinations in the presence
of relay nodes. Examples of such networks include hybrid wireless LAN/WAN networks and
sensor and ad hoc networks where cooperation between sources is either undesirable or not
possible, but one can use an intermediate relay nodes to aid communication between the sources
and the destination. As in multiuser wireless systems, access coordination among sources may
6Relay 1 Relay R
Destination
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be carried out in different domains: the frequency domain, time domain, code domain, and
space domain. Signals of different sources are insulated in each domain by splitting the resource
available into non-overlapping slots (frequency slot, time slot, code slot, and space slot) and
assigning each signal a slot. Four main multiple access technologies are used by the wireless
networks: frequency division multiple access (FDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA),
code division multiple access (CDMA), and space division multiple access (SDMA).
In multiple source networks, in addition to providing a diversity and/or multiplexing gain,
relay nodes can provide other tasks such as mitigating the interference effect among sources,
maximizing the signal to noise ratio, and minimizing the mean square error. Zero forcing
(ZF) relaying is a scheme in which the interference among sources can be completely removed
by adjusting the weights at relay nodes [15]-[18]. The minimum mean square error (MMSE)
relaying is another relaying scheme where the weights of relay nodes are adjusted to minimize
the mean square error between the source signal and the received signal at the destination [20]-
[22]. Coherent relaying, QR decomposition relaying, and distributed beamforming relaying
7proposed in [23, 24] and [25], respectively, are some other examples of relaying schemes in
multiple source relay networks.
1.2 Network Coding
Network coding has been originally proposed in information theory [2], and has since
emerged as one of the most promising information theoretic approaches to improve network
performance. The main idea of network coding is to allow coding at intermediate nodes in infor-
mation flows. It has been shown that random linear codes using a Galois field of a limited size
are sufficient to implement network coding in a practical network setting [26]. It has recently
been shown that network coding on GF(2) (i.e., XOR-only coding) is able to significantly im-
prove end-to-end unicast throughput in multi-hop wireless networks, when implemented above
the MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 [27, 28].
Physical layer network coding (PLNC) is a scheme that significantly enhances the through-
put performance of multi-hop wireless networks [29, 30]. Instead of avoiding interference
caused by simultaneous signals transmitted from multiple sources, PLNC exploits the interfer-
ence among sources to increase network capacity. When two sources transmit simultaneously,
the packets collide and the resulting signal is nothing but the sum of the two colliding signals.
Thus, if the receiver knows the content of one of the packets, it can decode the other.
1.3 Security issues in MARN
One of the primary concerns of wireless networks is security. Whenever there is a data
transmitted through the air, there is a higher chance of interceptions and illegal uses. Exam-
ples of vulnerabilities in wireless networks are: jamming, interference, disruption, interception,
spoofing, intrusion, and protocol violation. In addition to these vulnerabilities, MARN is ex-
posed to two other security concerns. The first concern is from an autonomous ad-hoc network
perspective, where each node is an autonomous entity and may have a lack of motivation to
cooperate, such as avoiding packet forwarding in order to preserve its own energy [32]. This
selfish behavior is considered as a passive noncooperation. The recent literature addresses
8passive noncooperation using a credit system [33] or reputation propagation system [34]. The
second concern is from the multi-hop network perspective. Relay nodes are usually deployed in
open and unattended area and thus are vulnerable to physical tempering. An adversary may
launch an attack on the network by altering the data through the relay nodes. If the access
node adopts the information from the attacked relay nodes, the performance of the wireless
multiple-access relay network can be degraded dramatically.
1.4 Message Ferrying
In Message Ferrying scheme, a moving relay or Message Ferry (MF) follows a “store, carry,
and forward” paradigm by accomplishing consecutive events: 1) moves toward the transmitting
node, 2) waits until it receives the message, 3) moves toward the receiving node, 4) waits until
it delivers the message. Although some routing algorithms have been proposed [79]- [80], the
design of the MF route is still an open research topic.
1.5 Related Work
In this section, we summarize some of the previous works which are related to our work.
1.5.1 Signatures for Content Distribution with Network Coding [38]
In this paper, the authors propose a signature scheme for network coding. The scheme
makes use of the linearity property of the packets in a coded system, and allows nodes to check
the integrity of the packets received easily. The authors show that the proposed scheme is
secure, and its overhead is negligible for large files.
The network is modeled by a directed graph Gd = (N,A), where N is the set of nodes,
and A is the set of communication links. A source node s ∈ N wishes to send a large file to
a set of client nodes, T ⊂ N . All the clients referred to as peers. The large file is divided
into m blocks, and any peer receives different blocks from the source node or from other peers.
In this framework, a peer is also a server to blocks it has downloaded, and always sends out
random linear combinations of all the blocks it has obtained so far to other peers. When a
9peer has received enough degrees of freedom to decode the data, i.e., it has received m linearly
independent blocks, it can re-construct the whole file.
The m blocks of the file, V 1, · · · , V m, can be shown as elements in n-dimensional vector
space Fnp , where p is a prime. The source node augments these vectors to create vectors
V1, · · · , Vm, given by
Vi = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0, vi1, · · · , vin) (1.8)
where the first m elements are zero except that the i-th element is 1, and vij ∈ Fp is the j-th
element in V i. Packets received by the peers are linear combinations of the augmented vectors,
W =
m∑
i=1
βiVi (1.9)
where βi is the weight of Vi in W . We see that the additional m elements in the front of the
augmented vector keeps track of the β values of the corresponding packet.
This kind of network coding scheme is vulnerable to pollution attacks by malicious nodes
and the pollution can quickly spread to other parts of the network if the peer just unwittingly
mixes this polluted packet into its outgoing packets. Unlike uncoded systems where the source
knows all the blocks being transmitted in the network, and therefore, can sign each one of
them, in a coded system, each peer produces “new” packets, and standard digital signature
schemes do not apply here. In the next section, we introduce a novel signature scheme for the
coded system.
The key observation for the proposed signature scheme is that the vectors V1, · · · , Vm
span a subspace V of Fm+np , and a received vector W is a valid linear combination of vectors
V1, · · · , Vm if and only if it belongs to the subspace V . In the proposed scheme, the authors
present a system that is based upon standard modulo arithmetic (in particular the hardness of
the Discrete Logarithm problem) and upon an invariant signature σ(V ) for the linear span V .
Each node verifies the integrity of a received vector W by checking the membership of W in
V based on the signature σ(V ). The signature scheme is defined by the following ingredients,
which are independent of the file(s) to be distributed:
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• q: a large prime number such that p is a divisor of q− 1. The standard techniques, such
as that used in Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), can be applied to find such q.
• g: a generator of the group G of order p in Fq. Since the order of the multiplicative group
F
∗
q is q − 1, which is a multiple of p, a subgroup, G, with order p in F∗q can be found.
• Private key: Kpr = {αi}i=1,··· ,m+n, a random set of elements in F∗p. Kpr is only known
to the source.
• Public key: Kpu = {hi = gαi}i=1,··· ,m+1. Kpu is signed by some standard signature
scheme, e.g., DSA, and published by the source.
To distribute a file in a secure manner, the signature scheme works as follows.
1. Using the vectors Vl, · · · , Vm from the file, the source finds a vector U = (ul, · · · , um+n) ∈
F
m+n
p orthogonal to all vectors in V . Specifically, the source finds a nonzero solution, U ,
to the equations
Vi.U = 0, i = 1, · · · ,m. (1.10)
2. The source computes vector X = (u1/α1, u2/α2, · · · , um+n/αm+n)
3. The source signs X with some standard signature scheme and publishes X. We refer to
the vector X as the signature, σ(V ), of the file being distributed.
4. The client node verifies that X is signed by the source.
5. When a node receives a vector W and wants to verify that W is in V , it computes
d =
m+n∏
i=1
hxiwii (1.11)
and verifies that d = 1.
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To see that d is equal to 1 for any valid W , we have
d =
m+n∏
i=1
hxiwii
=
m+n∏
i=1
(gαi)uiwi/αi
=
m+n∏
i=1
guiwi
=g
∑m+n
i=1 (uiwi)
=1 (1.12)
where the last equality comes from the fact that U is orthogonal to all vectors in V .
1.5.2 An Algebraic Watchdog for Wireless Network Coding [69]
In this paper, the authors proposed a scheme, called the algebraic watchdog for wireless
network coding, in which nodes can detect malicious behaviors probabilistically, police their
downstream neighbors locally using overheard messages, and, thus, provide a secure global self-
checking network. The proposed scheme gives the senders an active role in checking the node
downstream. The advantage of this watchdog scheme over the signature scheme discussed
in Section 1.5.1 is that the signature scheme assumes that the packets has to be correctly
received at the peer in order to check its integrity. However, this watchdog scheme assumes
noisy wireless channel over which the packets may contain some errors because of channel
impairments.
The wireless network in this paper is modeled with a hypergraph G = (V,E1, E2), where V
is the set of the nodes in the network, E1 is the set of hyperedges representing the connectivity
(wireless links), and E2 is the set of hyperedges representing the interference. We use the
hypergraph to capture the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. If (v1, v2) ∈ E1 and
(v1, v3) ∈ E2 where v1, v2, v3 ∈ V , then there is an intended transmission from v1 to v2, and v3
can overhear this transmission (possibly incorrectly). There is a certain transition probability
associated with the interference channels known to the nodes, and we model them with binary
channels.
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Figure 1.3 An example of a wireless network.
A node vi ∈ V transmits coded information xi by transmitting a packet pi, where pi =
[ai,hIi ,hxi ,xi] is a {0, 1}-vector. A valid packet pi is defined as below:
• ai corresponds to the coding coefficients αj , j ∈ Ii, where Ii ⊂ V is the set of nodes
adjacent to vi in E1
• hIi corresponds to the hash h(xi), vj ∈ Ii where h(.) is a h-bit polynomial hash function.
• hxi corresponds to the hash h(xi), vj ∈ Ii where h(.) is a h-bit polynomial hash function.
• xi is the n-bit representation of xi =
∑
j∈I αjxj
The goal is to explore an approach to detect and prevent malicious behaviors in wireless
networks using network coding. The scheme takes advantage of the wireless setting, where
neighbors can overhear others transmissions albeit with some noise, to verify probabilistically
that the next node in the path is behaving given the overheard transmissions.
As an example, consider the network (or a small neighborhood of nodes in a larger network)
shown in figure 1.3. In this network, nodes v1, v2 want to transmit x1, x2 to v4 via v3. The
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Figure 1.4 A graphical model from v1s perspective.
authors proposed two models in their paper. The graphical model is used to explain how
a node v1 checks the behavior of its neighbor v2. Then, the algebraic approach is used for
analysis.
As shown in Figure 1.4, the graphical model has four layers: Layer 1 contains 2n+h vertices,
each representing a bit-representation of [x˜2,h(x2)]; Layer 2 contains 2
n vertices, each repre-
senting a bit-representation of x2; Layer 3 contains 2
n vertices corresponding to x3; and Layer
4 contains 2n+h vertices corresponding to [x˜3,h(x3)]. Edges exist between adjacent layers as
follows:
• Layer 1 to Layer 2: An edge exists between a vertex [v,u] in Layer 1 and a vertex w in
Layer 2 if and only if h(w) = u. The edge weight is normalized such that the total weight
of edges leaving [v,u] is 1, and the weight is proportional to P(v| Channel statistics and
w is the original message) which is the probability that the inference channel outputs
message v given an input message w.
• Layer 2 to Layer 3: The edges represent a permutation. A vertex v in Layer 2 is adjacent
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to a vertex w in Layer 3 if and only if w = c+ α2v, where c = α1x1 is a constant, v and
w are the bit-representation of v and w, respectively. The edge weights are all 1.
• Layer 3 to Layer 4: An edge exists between a vertex v in Layer 3 and a vertex [w,u]
in Layer 4 if and only if h(v) = u. The edge weight is normalized such that the total
weight leaving v is 1, and is proportional to P(w| Channel statistics and v is the original
message)
Node v1 overhears the transmissions from v2 to v3 and from v3 to v4; therefore, it receives
[x˜2,h(x2)] and [x˜3,h(x3)], corresponding to the starting point in Layer 1 and the destination
point in Layer 4 respectively. By computing the sum of the product of the weights of all
possible paths between the starting and the destination points, v1 computes the probability
that v3 is consistent with the information gathered.
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Figure 1.5 Relay network of M sources, M destinations, and N cooperat-
ing relay
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1.5.3 A Cooperative MMSE Relay Strategy for Wireless Sensor Networks [21]
The authors of this paper proposed a minimum mean-square error (MMSE)-based signal
forwarding technique for a cooperative relay network. They consider the transmission of in-
formation between multiple source-destination pairs through a set of relays. Transmission
between M pairs of source-destination sensors through a set of N cooperative relay nodes is
shown in 1.5. The signals vector r received at the relay nodes is given by
r = Hss+ vs (1.13)
where Hs is the N ×M channel matrix between source nodes and relay nodes, s is the trans-
mitted data vector, and vs is complex additive white Gaussian noise vector. The signals vector
transmitted from the relay nodes is given by
x = Fr (1.14)
where F is an N × N transformation matrix to be determined in order to optimize receiver
performance. The received signal at the destination sensors can be written as
t = Htx+ vt
= HtFHss+HtFvs + vt (1.15)
where Ht is the M ×N channel matrix between relay nodes and the destination nodes, and vt
is complex additive white Gaussian noise vector.
The authors in this paper aim to determine F in order to minimize the mean square error
(MMSE) between the received signal Htx and the transmitted signal s , i.e.
Fˆ = argminF
M∑
m=1
E [ht,mx− sm]2 (1.16)
where ht,m is the m-th column of Ht. The optimal value of F is given by
Fopt =
(
HHt Ht + λ˜I
)−1
HHt H
H
s
(
HsH
H
s σ
2
s + σ
2
vsI
)−1
σ2s (1.17)
where σ2s is the variance of the transmitted symbol, σ
2
vs is the variance of the noise components
in vs, and λ˜ is the Lagrangian multiplier and can be determined from the power constraint
condition.
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1.6 Research Contributions
In this work, we considered a multiple access relay network and investigated the following
three problems: 1- Tradeoff Between Reliability and Security under Falsified Data Injection
Attacks; 2- Prioritized Analog Relaying; 3- Mitigation of Forwarding Misbehaviors in Multiple
Access Relay Network. We also consider the problem of delay Analysis in Message Ferrying
System.
In the first problem, we consider a multiple access relay network where multiple sources
send independent data to a single destination through multiple relays which may inject a
falsified data into the network. To detect the malicious relays and discard (erase) data from
them, tracing bits are embedded in the information data at each source node. Parity bits
may be also added to correct the errors caused by fading and noise. When the total amount
of redundancy, tracing bits plus parity bits, is fixed, an increase in parity bits to increase the
reliability requires a decrease in tracing bits which leads to a less accurate detection of malicious
behavior of relays, and vice versa. We investigate the tradeoff between the tracing bits and
the parity bits in minimizing the probability of decoding error and maximizing the throughput
in multi-source, multi-relay networks under falsified data injection attacks. The energy and
throughput gains provided by the optimal allocation of redundancy and the tradeoff between
reliability and security are analyzed.
In the second problem, we consider a multiple access relay network where multiple sources
send independent data simultaneously to a common destination through multiple relay nodes.
We present three prioritized analog cooperative relaying schemes that provide different quality
of service (QoS) to different sources while being relayed at the same time in the same frequency
band. The three schemes take the channel variations into account in determining the relay
encoding (combining) rule, but differ in terms of whether or how relays cooperate. Simula-
tion results on the symbol error probability and outage probability are provided to show the
effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
In the third problem, we propose a physical layer approach to detect the relay node that
injects false data or adds channel errors into the network encoder in multiple access relay
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networks. The misbehaving relay is detected by using the maximum a posteriori (MAP)
detection rule which is optimal in the sense of minimizing the probability of incorrect decision
(false alarm and miss detection). The proposed scheme does not require sending extra bits at
the source, such as hash function or message authentication check bits, and hence there is no
transmission overhead. The side information regarding the presence of forwarding misbehavior
is exploited at the decoder to enhance the reliability of decoding. We derive the probability of
false alarm and miss detection and the probability of bit error, taking into account the lossy
nature of wireless links.
In the fourth problem, we consider the message ferrying system and analyze the total delay
time in transferring the message between source and destination nodes taking into account the
effect of channel fading, path loss, and forward error correction. The performance gain in terms
of delay and energy provided by moving relay over static relay and the optimal locations of the
moving relay that minimize the total delay are determined. Both simulations and analytical
calculations are provided.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remainder part of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present an algo-
rithm to detect malicious relays in MARN where the system model is described in Section 2.2,
the error probability is analyzed in Section 2.3, and numerical results and discussions are pre-
sented in Section 2.4. In Chapter 3, we present prioritized relaying where the system model is
described in Section 3.2, the prioritized relaying scheme is presented in Section 3.3, the tradeoff
among cooperation extent, number of antennas per relay, and the number of relay nodes is
analyzed in Section 3.3.3, and numerical results and discussions are presented in Section 3.4.
In Chapter 4, we study the mitigation of forwarding misbehaviors in MARN where the system
model is described in Section 4.2, the MAP detection scheme is presented in Section 4.3, and
the derivations of probabilities of false alarm and miss detection are shown in Section 4.4. In
chapter 4.8, we present the MAP detection scheme in the case of M -ary modulation. Finally,
the conclusions and the future work are discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2. Tradeoff Between Reliability and Security under Falsified
Data Injection Attacks
We consider a multiple access relay network where multiple sources send independent data
to a single destination through multiple relays which may inject a falsified data into the network.
To detect the malicious relays and discard (erase) data from them, tracing bits are embedded
in the information data at each source node. Parity bits may be also added to correct the
errors caused by fading and noise. When the total amount of redundancy, tracing bits plus
parity bits, is fixed, an increase in parity bits to increase the reliability requires a decrease in
tracing bits which leads to a less accurate detection of malicious behavior of relays, and vice
versa. We investigate the tradeoff between the tracing bits and the parity bits in minimizing
the probability of decoding error and maximizing the throughput in multi-source, multi-relay
networks under falsified data injection attacks. The energy and throughput gains provided
by the optimal allocation of redundancy and the tradeoff between reliability and security are
analyzed.
2.1 Introduction
In multiple access relay networks, relay nodes may combine the symbols received from
different sources to generate parity symbols and send them to the destination. Then, the
destination may use the network generated parity symbols to enhance the reliability of decod-
ing [31]-[37]. While this technology is promising in improving communication quality, it also
presents a new challenge at the physical layer due to the dependency of the cooperation. That
is, reliance on implicit trust relationship among participating nodes makes it more vulnerable
to falsified data injection. Although this might also occur in a traditional system without
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cooperative communication, its effect is far more serious with cooperative communication. If
a junk packet is mixed into the buffer of a node, the buffer will be polluted, the output of the
node will become junk, and this may soon propagate to the entire network.
The problem of detecting malicious relay nodes in single-source, multi-relay networks has
been studied in the literature for different relaying strategies [38]–[42]. Relay nodes in [38]–[40]
apply network coding while those in [41, 42] follow the decode-and-forward protocol. In [38],
the authors consider a peer-to-peer (P2P) network in which peers receive and forward a linear
combination of the exogenous data packets. To check the integrity of the received packets, a
signature vector is generated at the source node and broadcasted to all nodes where it is used
to check the integrity of the received packets. In [39] and [40], several information theoretic
algorithms for mitigating falsified data injection effects are proposed. The network model used
in these works composed of single source, multiple intermediate nodes which apply network
coding.
In all algorithms proposed in [38]–[40], there are two fundamental assumptions. First, all
exogenous data packets are known at a single node to generate the hash or the signature vector.
Therefore, these algorithms cannot be applied in multi-source scenarios because each source
generates the packets independently and thus the packets of all sources are not available at
a single node. Second, each received packet is decoded independently, and then the integrity
of the decoded packet is checked using the hash or the signature vector. However, when
the received packets are combined before decoding, a different approach should be developed
to check the credibility (integrity) of the received packets. For example, in three-terminal
cooperative diversity systems, the packets from the source and that from the relay are combined
(e.g. using maximal ratio combining (MRC)) before decoding the message packet and then the
integrity is checked on the decoded message packet. In [41], the authors consider inserting a
number of tracing bits in the data stream at the source in a cryptographically secure manner
in single source scenario. The receiver then computes the ground truth of the tracing bits and
compares them with the tracing bits received from the relay path to determine whether a relay
node is adversarial or cooperative. If the correlation between them is above a threshold then
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we decide that the relay node is cooperative (H0) and, otherwise, it is malicious (H1). The
authors of [42] propose a statistical detection technique in order to mitigate malicious behavior
in adaptive decode-and-forward (DF) cooperative diversity.
In this work, we consider exploiting the information on the presence of attack in enhancing
the reliability of decoding by erasing (discarding) the data received from adversarial nodes and
correcting the erasures. The motivation is that erasures can be corrected twice as many as
errors [43]. However, the information on the presence of attack may not be perfect in practice.
The false alarm results in an erasure of correct bit, while the miss detection may result in an
error in place of an erasure. Since the probability of false alarm and that of miss detection
depend on the amount of tracing bits and the errors-and-erasures correction capability depends
on the amount of parity bits, we expect there exists an optimal allocation of the redundancy
between tracing bits and parity bits that minimizes the probability of decoding error at the
destination. Here, the tracing bits are to identify the malicious relay nodes and erase the
data received from them, while the parity bits are to the correct errors caused by channel and
noise. For a given redundancy, more parity bits (more reliability) implies less tracing bits (less
security), and vice versa. That is, there exists a tradeoff between reliability and security. Once
the malicious relay nodes are identified, some security measures such as en-route filtering [45]
and/or containment [46] may be applied to limit the spread of false data. We investigate the
optimal allocation of a given amount of redundancy (tradeoff) between tracing bits and parity
bits and the resulting performance gain in terms of the probability of decoding error and the
throughput.
The contributions of this part can be summarized as follow: 1) we propose an algorithm
to detect the malicious relays in multi-source, multi-relay wireless networks where the relay
nodes linerly combine the symbols of different sources; 2) we drive a closed form expression
for the probability of decoding error after applying the detection algorithm; 3) we present the
tradeoff between reliability and security in multiple access relay networks.
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Figure 2.1 M sources, L relays, and one destination wireless network.
2.2 System Model
We consider a two-hop multi-access relay network composed ofM sources, one destination,
and multiple relays, as shown in Figure 2.1. Each source generates an independent packets,
each is composed of an (n, k + t) codeword, where n is the code length, k is the number of
information bits, t is the number of tracing bits, and n−k−t is the number of parity bits. Each
source is assigned an orthogonal channel (time or frequency) and sends its codeword to the
destination. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the relays may also receive
the codewords. Each relay, after decoding, checks for errors using the cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) code1. The set of relays that receive the all M codewords without errors is called the
decoding set.
Each relay in the decoding set stores the received codewords in an n×M array. Then, it
generates a parity bit for each row of the array and forwards the parity bits (one column) to
the destination. Given that L relays are in the decoding set, the parity bit plj generated by
1This can be implemented by adding parity check bits on a block of message bits from each source for error
detection.
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the l-th relay, l = 1, 2, · · · , L, is given by
plj =
M∑
i=1
glibij , j = 1, 2, · · · , n (2.1)
where {bij} are the channel coded bits, {gli} are chosen to generate an (M + L,M) network
code for each row of the array. Thus, the destination may construct a two-dimensional (n, k+
t)× (M + L,M) product code.
We assume that the channel between a node (source or relay) and the destination is modeled
as Rayleigh flat fading and additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero and power spectral
density of N0/2. We assume that the message bits and the parity bits are transmitted using
BPSK modulation.
2.2.1 Attack Model
One of the common adversarial attacks at the malicious relay node is to inject falsified data.
In this work, we consider the attack model of changing the parity bit in (2.1) with probability
ǫ at a malicious relay node. Here, ǫ = 1 means all parity bits are flipped. In this case, once
the malicious behavior of a relay is detected, the destination may invert the data to get the
correct data. A more effective attack would be to change the parity bits with probability 1/2
which occurs when the malicious relay node sends a random bits instead of the original parity
bits. In this case, the received data may not be useful at the destination. As ǫ is decreased, it
becomes harder for the destination to detect the malicious behavior of the adversary. Hence,
the adversary can better hide its malicious activity and complicate the detection process at
the destination. We assume that traditional authentication schemes [47]–[50] are applied to
ensure the authentication at the destination and thus the sources can be trusted.
2.2.2 Detection Algorithm
Figure 2.2 shows the schematic diagram of detecting malicious relay nodes. The i-th source
node uses a secret key κi to generate a tracing sequence Ci = {ci1, ci2, · · · , cit} . We assume
that κi is known only to the destination and the i-th source node. At each source, the tracing
bits are embedded in the k message bits using a position key κp which is common for all sources
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Figure 2.2 Detection of malicious relays: source and destination work.
and is known to all source nodes and the destination. The generation and position keys are
assumed to be unknown to the relay nodes. So, even if a relay is compromised the information
on the tracing bits cannot be released to the attacker. The secret keys are exchanged at the
time of setting the application layer keys. To increase the security level, keys may be updated
periodically.
To detect malicious activity of the l-th relay, the destination calculates the Euclidean
distance between the received linear combination of tracing sequences Fl = (fl1, fl2, · · · , flt)
and the ground truth bits Al = (al1, al2, · · · , alt):
dl = ||Al − Fl||2
=
t∑
m=1
(alm − flm)2
=
t∑
m=1
(
a2lm + f
2
lm
)− t∑
m=1
2almflm (2.2)
25
If d is greater than a threshold, the destination decides that the relay is malicious, and,
otherwise, the relay is cooperative. The first term of (2.2) is 2t if alm, flm ∈ {+1,−1}, and
the second term is the cross correlation between Al and Fl. Since the first term of (2.2) is
constant, the proposed detection algorithm relies only on the correlation coefficient between
Al and Fl. The following detection algorithm is applied at the destination to detect malicious
relay nodes.
1. The secret key κi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M , is used to generate the tracing sequence Ci of the i-th
source.
2. The M tracing sequences, C1, C2, · · · , CM , are linearly combined bitwise using the same
parity generation rule used at the relay nodes, i.e. (2.1), to generate the ground truth
sequence {Al = (al1, al2, · · · , alt)}Ll=1, where alm =
∑M
i=1 glicim, m = 1, 2, · · · , t, and
alm ∈ {−1, 1}.
3. The position key κp is used to extract the linearly combined tracing sequence Fl =
(fl1, fl2, · · · , flt) from what is received from the l-th relay node where flm ∈ {−1, 1} 2
and m = 1, 2, · · · , t. In case of no channel error and no attack, we should have Al = Fl,
l = 1, 2, · · · , L.
4. The correlation coefficient ρl between Al and Fl of the l-th relay is defined as
ρl =
∑t
j=1 aljflj√∑t
j=1 a
2
lj
∑t
j=1 f
2
lj
l = 1, 2, · · · , L. (2.3)
5. The correlation coefficient is compared with a threshold η to decide whether a relay is
malicious (D1) or cooperative (D0) based on the following rule:
ρl
D0
R
D1
η (2.4)
2.2.3 Decoding Process at the Destination
We assume that if a relay is determined to be malicious, then the parity bits from that
relay are erased at the destination. The destination decodes the row vectors first to correct
2Soft detection of tracing bits is discussed in subsection 2.4.5.
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the errors and erasures. Then the column vectors are decoded to correct the remaining errors
after the row decoding.
2.3 Probability of Decoding Error
In this section, we drive the probability of decoding error at the destination. In our analysis,
if a decoding error occurs in a row vector, we assume that the entire bits in the corresponding
row vector are errornous (pessimistic assumption).
2.3.1 Probability Distribution of Correlation Coefficient
The probabilities of false alarm and miss detection depend on the probability distribution
of the correlation coefficient ρl. Since a
2
lj = f
2
lj = 1, it follows from (2.3) that
ρl =
1
t
t∑
j=1
aljflj . (2.5)
We decide that the l-th relay is malicious (D1) if ρl < η and cooperative (D0) otherwise. That
is,
P (D1) = P (ρl < η) (2.6)
and
P (D0) = P (ρl ≥ η). (2.7)
Let xlj = aljflj . When the l-th relay is cooperative (H0), the event xlj = −1 (or alj 6= flj)
occurs if the parity bit from the l-th relay node is received in error. Hence,
P (xlj = −1|H0) =1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯RD
1 + γ¯RD
)
=peRD (2.8)
where γ¯RD is the average received SNR on the relay-to-destination channel. Assuming that
errors within a codeword are independent (via interleaving), we obtain
P
(
ρl =
2i
t
− 1|H0
)
=
(
t
i
)
(1− peRD)ipt−ieRD (2.9)
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where i = 0, 1, 2, ..., t. When the relay is malicious (H1), we have
P (xlj = −1|H1) =ǫ(1− peRD) + (1− ǫ)peRD
=ξ (2.10)
Hence,
P
(
ρl =
2i
t
− 1|H1
)
=
(
t
i
)
(1− ξ)iξt−i (2.11)
2.3.2 Probability False Alarm and Miss Detection
The probability of false alarm is given by
PFA = P (D1|H0)
= P (ρl < η|H0)
=
⌈
(η+1)t
2
⌉
−1∑
i=0
(
t
i
)
(1− peRD)ipt−ieRD
(2.12)
and the probability of miss detection is given by
PMD = P (D0|H1)
= P (ρl ≥ η|H1)
=
t∑
i=
⌈
(η+1)t
2
⌉
(
t
i
)
(1− ξ)iξt−i
(2.13)
2.3.3 Probability of Bit Error and Bit Erasure
The parity bit from a relay node is erased if the destination decides that the relay node is
malicious. Hence, the probability of erasing a relay-generated parity bit is given by
per = P (D1)
= P (D1|H0)P (H0) + P (D1|H1)P (H1)
= PFAP (H0) + (1− PMD)P (H1). (2.14)
The probability that an error occurs on a relay-generated parity bit is given by
pep = P (error, D0, H0) + P (error, D0, H1)
+ P (error, D1, H0) + P (error, D1, H0)
(2.15)
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where the third and the fourth terms are zero because the relay parity bit is erased if D1
occurs. Since P (error|D0, H1) = ξ, we obtain
pep = P (error|D0, H0)P (D0, H0)
+ P (error|D0, H1)P (D0, H1)
= peRDP (D0, H0) + ξP (D0, H1)
= peRD (1− PFA)P (H0) + ξPMDP (H1) (2.16)
2.3.4 Probability of Decoding Error
In this subsection, we drive the probability of decoding error on the (n, k+ t)× (M +L,M)
product code. If the minimum distance of the (M + L,M) code is dh, the probability of
decoding error on a row vector is given by
PE,R = 1−
A∑
m=0
B∑
i=0
C∑
j=0
(
L
m, i
)
pmerp
i
ep(1− per − pep)L−m−i
×
(
M
j
)
pjem(1− pem)M−j
(2.17)
where A = dh − 1, B =
⌊
dh−1−m
2
⌋
, C =
⌊
dh−1−m−2i
2
⌋
,
(
L
m,i
)
= L!m!i!(L−m−i)! , and pem is the
probability of message bit error given by
pem =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯SD
1 + γ¯SD
)
(2.18)
where γ¯bSD is the average received SNR on the source-to-destination channel.
If a decoding occurs on a row vector then we assume that the entire bits in the corresponding
row vector are erroneous (pessimistic assumption). This results in a bit error in all column
vectors. If the column code (n, k + t) can correct up to e errors, the probability on decoding
error of a column vector is given by
PE,C =
n∑
i=e+1
(
n
i
)
P iE,R(1− PE,R)n−i. (2.19)
Hence, the probability of decoding error for the (n, k+ t)× (M+L,M) product code, hereafter
referred to as frame error rate, is given by
PB = 1− (1− PE,C)M . (2.20)
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If there is no assistance from the relays, the probability of decoding error on a column
vector is given by
PE,C =
n∑
i=e+1
(
n
i
)
piem(1− pem)n−i. (2.21)
Comparison of (2.19) and (2.21) suggests that the parity bits from relay nodes are helpful when
PE,R < pem. Otherwise, it is better to discard the relay parity bits.
2.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we present numerical results assuming that both row and column codes are
BCH codes. Unless otherwise indicated, we assume that ǫ = 1/2 and γ¯bSD = γ¯bRD = γ¯.
2.4.1 Reliability-Security Tradeoff
When the total amount of redundancy t + p is fixed, where p and t are the number of
parity and tracing bits, respectively, an increase in t (more accurate detection of malicious
relay nodes) requires a decrease in p (less error correction). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show
the frame error rate PB versus the probability of false alarm PFA and miss detection PMD,
respectively, when t + p is fixed at 70 for an (127, k + t) BCH code (i.e. p = n − k − t). In
general, as t increases, PFA and PMD decrease, thereby achieving more accurate detection of
malicious nodes. Once the malicious nodes are identified, security measures such as enroute
filtering and/or containment techniques may be applied to limit the spread of false data. We
find that there exists a fundamental tradeoff between the reliability measured by PB and the
security measured by PFA and PMD: as we require a higher security (lower PFA and PMD) we
get a less reliability (higher PB) and vice versa.
Figure 2.5 shows the frame error rate PB versus the number of tracing bits t when t + p
is fixed at 70. We find that there exists an optimal t (and p) that minimizes PB and that
the optimal t is larger for higher P (H1). Hence, for higher P (H1), more redundancy should
be allocated to the tracing bits in order to detect the malicious behavior of the relays more
accurately. We also find that the optimal t that minimizes PB decreases with decreasing SNR
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Figure 2.3 Frame error rate PB versus probability of false alarm PFA;
(127, 57 + t) BCH code, M = 7, L = 8, γ¯ = 20 dB, η = 0.65.
γ¯. Hence, for noisier channel, more redundancy should be allocated to the parity bits in order
to correct more errors caused by the noise.
2.4.2 Optimal Choice of Decision Threshold
Since erasures can be corrected twice as many as errors and the number of errors and era-
sures depends on both PFA and PMD, we expect that there exists an optimal η that minimizes
PB. Figure 2.6 shows PB versus the threshold η for several values of P (H1). We find that
the optimal threshold that minimizes PB lies in the range 0.45 ≤ ρopt ≤ 0.60.
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Figure 2.4 Frame error rate PB versus probability of miss detection PMD;
(127, 57 + t) BCH code, M = 7, L = 8, γ¯ = 20 dB, η = 0.65.
2.4.3 SNR Gain
Figure 2.7 shows PB versus the average bit SNR γ¯b, where γ¯b = γ¯ (kM/(n(M + L)))
−1 and
γ¯ is the average symbol SNR. We find that use of the optimal t provides a SNR gain of 10 dB
at PB = 2 × 10−4 over no tracing bits (t = 0). The error floor is due to a non-zero value of
P (H1) that leads to a non-zero probability of erasure bit error regardless of SNR.
2.4.4 Throughput Gain
Figure 2.8 shows the throughput W versus the total redundancy t+ p for several values of
P (H1), where the throughput is given by
W =
kM
n(M + L)
(1− PB) (2.22)
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The throughput is calculated using the optimal pair of t and p that minimizes PB. We find
that the optimal redundancy t+ p increases with the increase of P (H1) and that the falsified
data injection can significantly reduce the throughput. When P (H1) = 0.2, the maximum
throughput is 0.293, whereas the maximum throughput in the case of no attack ( P (H1) = 0)
is 0.441.
2.4.5 Soft-Decision Correlation
The detection of malicious relays relies on the correlation between the ground truth bits
and the detected parity bits. The accuracy of detection, measured by the probability of false
alarm and miss detection, affects both security and reliability. If a relay node is identified to
be malicious, then its data are erased (discarded) and erasure correction scheme can be used
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to correct the erasures. Detection of malicious relay nodes may also allow further actions,
such as en-route filtering [45] and/or containment [46] to limit the spread of falsified data,
thereby enhancing the security. In this section, we discuss a soft-decision correlation (SC)
technique that computes the correlation coefficient based on the soft (non-quantized) decision
of the parity bits. We compare the performance of SC with the hard-decision correlation (HC)
presented in Section 2.3.
Soft-decision Correlation Coefficient The received signal from the l-th relay node is
given by
ylj = hljslj + nlj j = 1, 2, · · · , n (2.23)
where hlj is the channel gain between the l-th relay and the destination, slj ∈ {+Eb,−Eb} is
the transmitted bit by the l-th relay, and nlj is the additive white Gaussian noise. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the t tracing bits are located in the first t coordinates of
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each codeword. Then, the soft-decision correlation coefficient is defined as
ρSl =
∑t
j=1 aljylj√∑t
j=1 a
2
lj
∑t
j=1 y
2
lj
=
1√
t
∑t
j=1 aljylj√∑t
j=1 y
2
lj
l = 1, 2, · · · , L. (2.24)
It follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that −1 ≤ ρSl ≤ +1. Now, the value of ρSl is
compared with a threshold η to determine whether the l-th relay node is malicious (ρSl < η)
or cooperative (ρSl > η).
Comparison between SC and HC Figure 2.9 shows the probability of false alarm PFA
and miss detection PMD versus the number of tracing bits. We find that SC can significantly
reduce PFA and PMD or the number of tracing bits for a given PFA and PMD. The saved
redundancy can then be allocated to the parity bits to further enhance the reliability or be
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redirected towards sending more information bits to increase the throughput.
Figure 2.10 compares the throughputs with SC, HC, and no tracing bits (t = 0). We
find that SC can increase the maximum throughput by about 7% over HC and 31.8% over no
tracing bits.
Figure 2.11 shows the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) at different values of SNR.
We find that the improvement provided by SC over HC is more significant at lower SNR γ¯.
This is because the SC is based on the actual value of the received signal while the HC is based
on its quantized value. This quantization introduces a significant number of errors in making
decisions on {Flj}’s in low SNR region, hence providing a low performance.
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2.4.6 Effect of Attack Probability ǫ
Figure 2.12 shows the frame error rate PB against ǫ for different values of t when t + p is
fixed. We find that there exists an optimal ǫ (from adversary point of view) that maximizes
PB. This can be explained as follows. When ǫ is very small (close to 0), the adversary
behaves almost like a cooperative relay. Hence, PB would be small. However, if ǫ is very large
(close to 1), almost all parity bits are changed by the adversary, making the received parity
bits not useful for decoding. However, the malicious behavior can be easily detected (hence,
corresponding parity bits are erased) by the destination due to low correlation. Hence, from
the adversary point of view, there exists an optimal ǫ that maximizes PB, and the optimal
ǫ increases with decreasing t when t + p is fixed. That is, if the communicator uses a small
number of tracing bits (small t), then it is better for the adversary to increase the probability
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of changing the data (large ǫ), and vice versa. From the communicator point of view, when
ǫ is small (say ǫ < 0.4) allocating all available redundancy to the parity bits (hence, t = 0)
provides the lowest PB. For higher ǫ, a proper combination of t and p provides the lowest PB.
For example, the optimal (t, p) pair is (14, 56) when 0.32 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.52 for the given parameters
in Figure 2.12.
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CHAPTER 3. Prioritized Analog Relaying in Multiple Access Relay
Networks
We consider a multiple access relay network where multiple sources send independent data
simultaneously to a common destination through multiple relay nodes. We present three
prioritized analog cooperative relaying schemes that provide different quality of service (QoS)
to different sources while being relayed at the same time in the same frequency band. The three
schemes take the channel variations into account in determining the relay encoding (combining)
rule, but differ in terms of whether or how relays cooperate. Simulation results on the symbol
error probability and outage probability are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes.
Keywords: Prioritized relaying, analog network coding, cooperation, multiple access relay
network.
3.1 Introduction
Recently, cooperative relaying is gaining significant attention. In this approach, multiple
intermediate nodes (relays) cooperate with each other to enhance the overall network efficiency.
It exploits the physical-layer broadcast property offered by the wireless medium where the
transmitted signals can be received and processed by any node in the neighborhood of a
transmitter. The cooperative relaying approach has great potential to provide substantial
benefits in terms of reliability (diversity gain) [5, 6] and rate (bandwidth or spectral efficiency)
[9]-[12]. These benefits can extend the coverage, reduce network energy consumption, and
promote uniform energy drainage by exploiting neighbors’ resources. They can be of great
value in many applications, including ad-hoc networks, mesh networks, and next generation
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wireless local area networks and cellular networks.
Several cooperative relaying protocols have been proposed in the literature to achieve dif-
ferent tasks. In the amplify-and forward (AF) protocol [5], the relay node simply amplifies the
received signal and forwards the amplified version to the destination. The amplification weight
at each relay node is chosen according to the relay power constraint. In the decode-and-forward
(DF) protocol [5], the relay node decodes the received signal, re-encodes it, and forwards the
encoded signal to the destination. In multiple-source relay networks, relay nodes may suppress
the mutual interference among sources. Zero forcing (ZF) relaying is a scheme in which the
interference among the sources can be completely removed by adjusting the weights at relay
nodes [16]-[18]. The minimum mean square error (MMSE) relaying is another relaying scheme
where the weights of relay nodes are adjusted to minimize the mean square error between
the source signal and the received signal at the destination [20]-[22]. Coherent relaying, QR
decomposition relaying, and distributed beamforming relaying, proposed in [23, 24] and [25],
respectively, are some other examples of relaying schemes in multiple source relay networks.
Although shown to be useful in a variety of theoretical and practical settings, they assume
that all packets and nodes are equally important. In many communication scenarios, however,
some packets may be more important (critical) than others or some nodes may require a higher
priority than others. For instance, some nodes may need more assistance than others because
of deep fading or limited battery. Providing a uniform protection of all nodes and packets may
be either a wasteful or an infeasible approach in practical scenarios.
The role of relay nodes can be extended to provide different priorities to different sources.
The authors of [19] consider a multiple-sources, multiple-destinations network and propose a
distributed beamforming relaying scheme that provides different QoS requirements for each
source-destination pair. The optimal beamforming weights are derived to meet a given set of
target signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) while minimizing the total transmit power
of the relay nodes. This work, however, assumes no cooperation among the relays and each
relay is equipped with a single antenna.
In this chapter, we consider a multiple access relay network in which the relays are equipped
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with multiple antennas and cooperate in relaying the messages in three different levels: no
cooperation, partial cooperation, and full cooperation. We assume all nodes (sources or relays)
send data simultaneously in the same frequency band, which enables the spectrum efficiency
to be improved at the cost of increased computational complexity for suppressing the mutual
interference. We present prioritized analog cooperative relaying schemes that provide different
reliability or rate (QoS) to different sources in each relay cooperation scenario.
Method I considers the case where each relay does not know the received signals at other
relays (i.e. no cooperation among relays). If there areN sources and the destination is equipped
with K antennas, the required number of relays is KN assuming that each relay is equipped
with a single antenna. Method II considers the case where each relay knows the received
signals at other relays (i.e. full cooperation of relays). When each relay is equipped with a
single antenna, this method requires max(N,K) relays. In Method III, relays are grouped and
only the relays within a group are allowed to cooperate. Methods I and II can be considered
as special cases of Method III where the group size is 1 and N , respectively. If the number of
relays per group is L and each relay is equipped withM antennas, then the required number of
relays with Method III can be shown to be KN/(LM2). This means that the required number
of relays decreases on the order of 1/(LM2). We present the symbol error rate and the outage
probability of the three prioritized analog cooperative relaying schemes.
The remainder part of this chapter is organized as follows. The system model is described
in Section 3.2. The prioritized cooperative relaying schemes are described in Section 3.3. The
tradeoff among relay cooperations, number of antennas per relay, and the number of relays is
discussed. Section 3.4 presents numerical results and discussions. Finally, the conclusions are
drawn in Section 3.5.
3.2 System Model
We consider a two-hop multi-access relay network composed of N sources, R relays, and
one destination, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. We first consider the case where source and
relay nodes are equipped with a single antenna, and the destination node is equipped with K
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Figure 3.1 System Model: N sources, R relays, one destination with K
antennas
antennas. In Section 3.3.3, we consider a more general case where the relays have multiple
antennas. We assume a two-phase communication scenario. In the first phase, the N sources
send their symbols to the R relay nodes simultaneously over the same frequency band. In
the second phase, each relay multiplies the received (mixed) signal by a certain weight and all
relay nodes send their weighted signals to the destination simultaneously in the same frequency
band. Because all nodes are sending simultaneously in the same frequency band, the spectrum
efficiency can be significantly improved when compared to sending over orthogonal channels.
We assume that the destination is located outside the transmission range of the N sources and
therefore there is no direct link between source nodes and the destination. The destination
determines the source messages based on the signals received from the relays.
We denote the normalized distance between the r-th relay and the n-th source by drn
and that between the r-th relay and the destination by drD. The source-to-relay and relay-
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to-destination channels are modeled as Rayleigh flat fading with zero-mean additive complex
white Gaussian noise. The channel gain matrix between sources and relays and that between
relays and destination are denoted by G ∈ CR×N and F ∈ CK×R, respectively. If we let grn be
the entry in the r-th row and the n-th column of G, then the variance of grn is d
−α
rn where α
is the path loss exponent. Similarly, the entries of F have variance {d−αrD}. It is assumed that
G and F are known at the destination node.
The received signal at the relay nodes in the first phase is given by
z = Gs+ nr (3.1)
where z = [z1 z2 · · · zR]T is an R×1 vector, s = [s1 s2 · · · sN ]T is the N×1 transmitted vector,
and nr is an R × 1 ACWGN vector at the relay nodes. To enable a prioritized relaying, the
received signals at the relay nodes are multiplied by a prioritization weight matrix A and sent
to the destination simultaneously in the second phase. The transmit vector x = [x1 x2 · · · xR]T
at the relay nodes is given by
x =
q√
Tr (AA†)
Az (3.2)
where A is an R × R prioritization wieght matrix, q is the amplification factor at each relay
node,
√
Tr (AA†) is a normalization factor, and “†” stands for the conjugate transpose. The
amplification factor q is chosen to adjust the transmit power of the relay nodes.
The received signal vector y = [y1 y2 · · · yK ]T at the destination in the second phase is
given by
y = Fx+ nd
=
q√
Tr (AA†)
FAz+ nd (3.3)
where nd is an K × 1 ACWGN vector at the destination. The noise vectors nr, and nd are
assumed to have zero mean and covariance matrices σ2nrIR, and σ
2
nd
IK , respectively, where IR
and IK are identity matrices with sizes indicated in the subscripts.
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Combining (3.1) and (3.3), the received signal vector at the destination can be expressed
as
y =
q√
Tr (AA†)
Hs+w (3.4)
where H = FAG is K ×N equivalent channel matrix and w = nd +
(
q/
√
Tr (AA†)
)
FAnr is
a K × 1 equivalent noise vector.
If we let Es be the transmit symbol energy per source, i.e. Es = E
[
|si|2
]
, and Er be the
average transmit energy per relay, then the average transmit energy per symbol is given by
ET =
NEs +REr
N
(3.5)
Since the total transmit energy of relay nodes is Tr
(
E
[
xx†
])
, we obtain
REr =Tr
(
E
[
xx†
])
=Esq
2Tr
(
E
[
A†A
Tr (AA†)
GG†
])
+ q2σ2nr (3.6)
Substituting (3.6) into (3.5) yields
q =
√√√√√ N (ET − Es)
EsTr
(
E
[
A†A
Tr(AA†)
GG†
])
+ σ2nr
(3.7)
3.3 Prioritized Analog Network Coding Schemes
In order to relay the n-th source with a higher priority than the m-th source, the average
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the n-th source, γn, has to be higher than that
of the m-th source, γm. This prioritization can be achieved by carefully choosing the entries
of the prioritization weight matrix A.
If h1,h2, · · · ,hN are the column vectors (K × 1) of H, the received vector y in (3.4) can
be written as
y =
q√
Tr (AA†)
(h1s1 + h2s2 + · · ·+ hNsN ) +w (3.8)
Then, the instantaneous SINR for the n-th source is given by
γn =
h†nhnEsq2/Tr
(
AA†
)
Esq2
(∑N
i=1
i 6=n
h†ihi/Tr (AA†)
)
+ E [w†w]
(3.9)
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After averaging the numerator and the denominator over A for a given hn, we obtain the
average SINR
γn =
PnEsq
2E
[
1/Tr
(
AA†
)]
Esq2E [1/Tr (AA†)]
(∑N
i=1
i 6=n
Pi
)
+ E [w†w]
(3.10)
where Pn = h
†
nhn is the received signal strength of the n-th source. Then, it is shown in
Appendix A that γn ≥ γm if and only if Pn ≥ Pm. Hence, the prioritization of the n-th
source over the m-th source can be achieved by designing the prioritization matrix A such that
Pn > Pm. Without loss of generality, we will assume P1 ≥ P2 ≥ · · · ≥ PN in what follows.
3.3.1 Method I (No Cooperation)
Method I assumes that each relay node does not know the received signals at other relays.
Hence, the prioritization matrix A (R×R) is a diagonal matrix that satisfies
FAG = H (3.11)
or
R∑
r=1
fkrgrnarr = hkn (3.12)
where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} and n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Since the number of equations is KN and the
number of unknowns a11, a22, · · · , aRR is R, it is required R has to be KN in order to have a
unique solution. This set of linear equations can be solved at the destination1 and the solution
a11, a22, · · · , aRR can be fed back to the relay nodes.
3.3.2 Method II (Full Cooperation)
Method II assumes that each relay knows the received signals at all other relays. This
requires a full cooperation among relays to share their received signals. Under this scenario,
the solution for A that satisfies (3.11) can be obtained by multiplying H by the pseudo inverses
of F and G as follows:
A = F †
(
FF †
)−1
H
(
G†G
)−1
G† (3.13)
1It is assumed that the destination has all channel information {fkr, grn}.
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Table 3.1 Comparison between method I and method II
Cooperation among Minimum number of Minimum feedback
relays of relays overhead
Method I None NK NK
Method II Full max(N,K) [max(N,K)]2
In order for the pseudo inverses of F (K×R) and G (R×N) to exist, it is required that R ≥ K
and R ≥ N , respectively. Therefore, the minimum number of relays is max(N,K). If K has
to be at least N (e.g. zero-forcing), then the minimum number of relays is K. An alternate
method to find A is to solve a set of linear equations. Since the number of equations is KN
and the number of unknowns is R2, the number of relays R should be R ≥ √KN . When
P1 = P2 = · · · = PN , A is found in [18] using the pseudo inverse solution. The matrix A may
be calculated at the destination and fed back to the relay nodes.
Comparison Between Method I and Method II:
Table 3.1 summarizes the minimum number of relays and the amount of feedback from
the destination to the relays with Method I and Method II. We can see that the cooperation
among the relays can reduce the required number of relays by a factor of 1/N when K = N
at the cost of additional overhead of exchanging the received signals among the relays. In
Section 3.3.3, we will discuss the tradeoff among the degree of relay cooperation, number of
relays, and the number of antennas per relay.
Design of H: The decoding complexity at the destination can be reduced if H is a diagonal
matrix with elements
√
P1,
√
P2, · · · ,
√
PN in the main diagonal for the case of K = N . This
enables the interference among the sources to be completely removed while the received signal
strengths are set to the desired levels.
3.3.3 Method III (Partial Cooperation)
Method I requires no cooperation among the relays but requires KN relays, while Method
II requires full cooperation among the relays but requires max(K,N) relays. In both methods,
it is assumed that each relay has a single antenna. In this subsection, we consider a more
general scenario where R relays, each equipped with L antennas, are divided into groups and
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only those relays within a group are allowed to cooperate, i.e. share their received signals.
Then, Methods I and II correspond to the special cases of group size being equal to 1 and N ,
respectively, and L = 1. We determine the relationship among the number of relays per group,
number of antennas per relay, and the total number of relays in determining the prioritization
matrix A that enables a certain prioritization.
If there are L relays in each group and each relay is equipped with M antennas, then the
prioritization matrix A can have at most LM non-zero entries in each row. The matrix A is a
block diagonal matrix of the form
A =

A1
0
A2
. . .
0
AR/L

(3.14)
where A1, A2, · · · , AR/L are LM × LM matrices. Since the number of equations in (3.11) is
KN and the number of unknowns, i.e. the number of non-zero entries of A is (R/L)(LM)2, the
number of relays R has to be equal to KN/(LM2) in order to get a unique solution for (3.11).
It should be noted that the required number of relays decreases on the order of 1/(LM2). This
shows that increasing the number of cooperating relays and, more importantly, the number of
antennas per relay are vital in reducing the required total number of relays. The set of linear
equations used to solve for entries of A that satisfies (3.11) is given by
R/L−1∑
t=0
LM∑
i=1
LM∑
j=1
fk(i+LMt)g(j+LMt)na(i+LMt)(j+LMt) = hkn (3.15)
for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
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Figure 3.2 Average SINR γ vs Eb/N0, Method I; N = 3,K = 3, R = 9,
∆12 = 5dB, ∆23 = 3dB.
3.4 Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section, we present simulation results for the average symbol error rate (SER) and
the outage probability, Pout. We consider 4-QAM modulation with Es = ET /2 and H is a
diagonal matrix with P1 = 1 (0dB). We assume that α = 3, drD = 1 for all r, and drn is
uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 1.5.
Fig. 3.2 shows the average SINR against Eb/N0 with Method I for the case of 3 sources,
3 antennas at the destination (K = 3), and 9 relays, where Eb/N0 is the transmit SNR per
information bit. The diagonal elements
√
P1,
√
P2,
√
P3 of H are chosen such that P1 = 0dB,
P2 = −5dB, and P3 = −8dB. If we let ∆ij = 10 log10 (Pi/Pj) be the relative power gain
for the i-th source over the j-th source, then ∆12 = 5dB and ∆23 = 3dB. Fig. 3.3 shows
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Figure 3.3 Average SINR γ vs Eb/N0, Method II; N = 3,K = 3, R = 3,
∆12 = 5dB, ∆23 = 3dB.
the average SINR against Eb/N0 with Method II for the case of 3 sources, 3 antennas at the
destination (K = 3), and 3 relays. Figs 3.4 and 3.5 show the SER against Eb/N0 with
Method I and Method II, respectively, for the same set of SINRs. We can see that Methods
I and II can indeed achieve a prescribed set of SINRs. Fig. 3.6 compares the average SER,
averaged over all sources, with Method I and II when N = 2,K = 2, R = 4. We find that
the average SER with Method II is much lower than that with Method I, mainly due to the
diversity order of 3 with Method II and the diversity order of 1 with Method I. Method II
requires R = max(K,N) = 2 to get A from (3.13) while Method I requires R = KN = 4 to
get arr from (3.12). Hence, the remaining two relays in Method II can be used to increase the
diversity order by two. However, it should be noted that this diversity gain is achieved at the
cost of relay cooperation.
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Figure 3.4 SER vs Eb/N0 with Method I; N = 3,K = 3, R = 9,
∆12 = 5dB, ∆23 = 3dB.
Now, consider the case when N = 4,K = 4 and ∆n(n+1) = 5dB where each relay has a
single antenna and two relays are allowed to cooperate (i.e., M = 1, L = 2) in Method III.
Therefore, the minimum number of relay nodes is R = 8. Fig. 3.7 shows the SER against Eb/N0
for this case. We find that the n-th source has a better SER performance than the (n+ 1)-th
source. We also find that the n-th source outperforms the (n+1)-th source by exactly 5dB at
any given SER. Fig. 3.8 compares the average SER, averaged over all sources, for different sets
of L andM . L = 1,M = 1, R = 16 corresponds to Method I, L = 4,M = 1, R = 4 corresponds
to Method II, and L = 2,M = 2, R = 2 corresponds to Method III. We can see that Method II
and III performs almost identically, while Method I performs worse than Methods II and III.
Figs 3.9 and 3.10 show the outage probability Pout against a target rate η when sources
are prioritized using Method I and Method II, respectively. The outage probability of the n-th
52
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Eb / N0
SE
R
 
 
Source 3
Source 2
Source 1
Average
Figure 3.5 SER vs Eb/N0 with Method II; N = 3,K = 3, R = 3,
∆12 = 5dB, ∆23 = 3dB.
source is defined by
Pout = Pr
[
1
2
log2 (1 + γn) < η
]
(3.16)
We can see that the prioritized sources can achieve a higher rate than non-prioritized sources
for the same outage probability.
3.5 Conclusions
We proposed prioritized analog cooperative relaying schemes that provide different SINRs
to different sources in multiple access relay networks. We considered a general system model in
which relay nodes have multiple antennas and cooperate in relaying the overheard messages in
three different levels: no cooperation, partial cooperation, and full cooperation. The proposed
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Figure 3.6 SER vs Eb/N0; N = 2,K = 2, R = 4.
schemes enable the source with a higher priority level to send data at a higher rate or lower error
probability while being relayed with other sources at the same time in the same bandwidth.
This enables the spectrum efficiency to be improved at the cost of increased computational
complexity for suppressing the mutual interference. We discussed the required number of relays
as a function of the number of antennas per relay and the number of cooperating relays. Our
simulation results show that the proposed cooperative relaying schemes can indeed achieve the
prescribed set of prioritizations.
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Figure 3.7 SER vs Eb/N0 with Method III; N = 4, K = 4, L = 2, M = 1,
R = 8, ∆12 = ∆23 = ∆34 = 5dB.
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Figure 3.8 SER vs Eb/N0; N = 4,K = 4.
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Figure 3.9 Outage Probability vs rate (η) with Method I; N = 3, K = 3,
R = 9, ∆12 = 5dB,∆23 = 3dB, Eb/N0 = 20dB.
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Figure 3.10 Outage Probability vs rate (η) with Method II; N = 3, K = 3,
R = 3, ∆12 = 5dB, ∆23 = 3dB , Eb/N0 = 20dB.
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CHAPTER 4. Mitigation of Forwarding Misbehaviors in Multiple Access
Relay Network
We propose a physical layer approach to detect the relay node that injects false data or adds
channel errors into the network encoder in multiple access relay networks. The misbehaving
relay is detected by using the maximum a posteriori (MAP) detection rule which is optimal in
the sense of minimizing the probability of incorrect decision (false alarm and miss detection).
The proposed scheme does not require sending extra bits at the source, such as hash function
or message authentication check bits, and hence there is no transmission overhead. The side
information regarding the presence of forwarding misbehavior is exploited at the decoder to
enhance the reliability of decoding. We derive the probability of false alarm and miss detection
and the probability of bit error, taking into account the lossy nature of wireless links.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, several network coding techniques have been studied in multiple access relay
networks where multiple sources communicate with a common destination with the assistance
from a set of relays. The basic idea of network coding in multiple access relay networks is to
combine the information along the direct path from the source with the information received
from the relays, where information from multiple sources are encoded (mixed), to enhance the
reliability of decoding at the destination.
Information theoretic study on the multiple access relay channel (MARC) was first in-
troduced in [56]. Outer bounds on the capacity of the MARC has been studied in [57], the
diversity-multiplexing tradeoff has been developed in [58], [59], [60], and an outage minimizing
relaying strategy has been studied in [61]. Authors in [62] investigated the cooperative diver-
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sity gain offered by network coding, assuming that the relays are able to decode all source
messages reliably. Authors in [63] proposed a network coding scheme based on lowdensity
parity-check (LDPC) codes that accounts for the lossy nature of wireless networks and showed
that a significant coding/diversity gain can be achieved.
While network coding has proven to be promising in enhancing the communication effi-
ciency, it also presents a new security challenge at the physical layer due to the dependency
of cooperation. That is, reliance on implicit trust relationship between source and relay nodes
makes it more vulnerable to false data injection at the relay and channel errors between source
and relay. Since network coding allows the relays to mix data contents, a few corrupted data
caused by either falsely injected data or channel errors can end up corrupting all the data
reaching the destination. Without properly addressing this problem, network coding would
not be effectively used in realworld applications.
The problem of detecting misbehaving relays that inject false data in single-source networks
has been studied in [64]- [67]. In [64] the authors consider a peer-to-peer (P2P) network in
which peers receive and forward a linear combination of the exogenous data packets. To check
the integrity of the received packets, a signature vector is generated at the source node and
broadcasted to all nodes where it is used to check the integrity of the received packets. In
[65] and [66] several information theoretic algorithms for mitigating Bizantine modification
attack are proposed. In [67] the authors consider inserting tracing bits in the data stream
at the source in a cryptographically secure manner. The receiver then computes the ground
truth of the tracing bits and compares them with the tracing bits received from a relay to
determine whether it is malicious or cooperative. Extensions to multiple-source network have
been studied in [68], [69], where the tracing bits or polynomial hash functions are used in
detecting the misbehaving relays. All these works, however, require sending extra reference
data (overhead) at the source to detect the misbehaving relay.
In this paper, we propose the maximum a posteriori (MAP) approach in detecting the
misbehaving relay that injects false data or adds channel errors into the network encoder in
multiple access relay networks. The MAP detection rule is based on the log-likelihood ratio
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(LLR) test which is optimal in the sense of minimizing the probability of incorrect decision
(false alarm and miss detection). The proposed scheme does not require sending extra bits at
the source, such as hash function or message authentication check bits, and hence there is no
transmission overhead. In addition, it makes an instantaneous decision about whether a relay
is behaving properly without a long term observation.
The side information regarding the presence of misbehaving relay can be exploited at
the destination (decoder) to enhance the reliability of decoding. We propose an effective
decoding scheme that exploits the side information and significantly enhances the reliability
of decoding. In practice, however, the side information may not be perfect. The false alarm
results in an incorrect usage of the side information provided by the well-behaving relay, while
the miss detection results in a usage of wrong information provided by the misbehaving relay,
in decoding the source messages. We derive the probability of false alarm and miss detection
and the probability of bit error as a function of the signal-to-noise ratio, taking into account
the lossy nature of wireless links. We show that the proposed decoding with the aid of the
MAP detection of misbehaving relay is within 1dB away from the genie-aided decoding.
4.2 System Model
Consider a multi-access relay network composed of two sources, one relay, and one des-
tination as shown in Figure 4.1. Extension to multiple relays will be considered later. The
relay overhears the bits sent by the sources (possibly with some errors), encodes them, and
forwards the encoded bit to the destination. We assume that all bits are sent through orthogo-
nal Rayleigh fading channels with additive white Gaussian noise and path loss, and each node
is equipped with single antenna.
Let xi ∈ {+1,−1} denote the bit transmitted by the i-th source, i = 1, 2, and xri ∈
{+1,−1}denote the overheard bit by the relay, where +1 is the additive identity element
under ⊕ (modulo-2) addition. The relay combines the overheard bits and produces a coded
(parity) bit
p = xr1 ⊕ xr2 ⊕ f (4.1)
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Figure 4.1 System Model
where f ∈ {+1,−1} denotes the injected bit by the relay to corrupt the communication. If
f = −1, false bit is injected, and if f = +1, no false bit is injected.
Let ei ∈ {+1,−1} be the error value between the i-th source and the relay, i.e. xri = xi⊕ei,
where ei = −1 means xri 6= xi, i.e. xi is received in error at the relay, and ei = +1 means
xri = xi. Then, 4.1 can be written as
p = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ e1 ⊕ e2 ⊕ f
= x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ z (4.2)
where
z = e1 ⊕ e2 ⊕ f (4.3)
captures the error events on the source-to-relay channels as well as the false data injection by
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Table 4.1 Code book for Encoder (Relay)
z = +1 z = −1
ct0 000 001
ct1 011 010
ct2 101 100
ct3 110 111
the relay.
Let pi := P (ei = −1) be the probability of bit error between the i-th source and relay,
i = 1, 2, and pf := P (f = −1) be the probability that a false bit (f = −1) is injected at the
relay. Then, the event z = −1, i.e. wrong encoding (forwarding misbehavior), occurs when
one or three of e1, e2, f are −1. Hence, we obtain
P (z = −1) =pf (1− 2p1 − 2p2 + 3p1p2)
+ (p1 + p2 − 2p1p2) (4.4)
and P (z = +1) = 1−P (z = −1). Table 4.1 shows the transmitter side code book when z = +1
and z = −1.
The received signals at the destination are given by
yi = hixi
√
d−mi Es + ni, i = 1, 2 (4.5)
yr = hrp
√
d−mr Er + nr (4.6)
where
• yi and yr are the received signals from the i-th source and the relay, respectively
• hi and hr are the channel fading gain between the i-th source and the destination and
that between the relay and the destination, respectively
• di and dr are the distance between the i-th source and the destination and that between
the relay and the destination, respectively
• m is the path loss exponent
• Es and Er are the transmit energy per symbol at the source and the relay, respectively
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• ni and nr are the noise at the destination.
It is assumed that hi and hr are independent complex Gaussian random variables with mean
zero and variance one, and ni and nr are independent complex Gaussian random variables
with mean zero and variance N0/2 per dimension.
4.3 MAP Detection Scheme
The destination is interested in finding z whether z is +1 (well-behaving) or −1 (misbe-
having). The maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision rule which minimizes the probability of
incorrect decision is based on the LLR of z:
L (z|h,y) = ln P (z = +1|h,y)
P (z = −1|h,y)
= ln
P (p⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 = +1|h,y)
P (p⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 = −1|h,y)
≈sign (L(p|hr, yr)) .sign (L(x1|h1, y1))
.sign (L(x2|h2, y2)) .min{|L(xr|hr, yr)|,
|L(x1|h1, y1)|, |L(x2|h2, y2)|} (4.7)
where h = [h1 h2 h3]
T ,y = [y1 y2 yr]
T , and
L(xi|hi, yi) = ln P (xi = +1|hi, yi)
P (xi = −1|hi, yi)
=
4
√
d−mi Es
N0
Re{h∗i yi} (4.8)
is the LLR of xi after knowing hi and yi. Similarly
L(p|hr, yr) = ln P (p = +1|hr, yr)
P (p = −1|hr, yr)
=
4
√
d−mr Er
N0
Re{h∗ryr} (4.9)
is the LLR of p after knowing hr and yr. The approximation in (4.7) follows from [70]. Then
the MAP decision rule is to decide
zˆ =
 +1, if L (z|h,y) ≥ 0−1, if L (z|h,y) < 0 (4.10)
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where zˆ is the estimation of z. For simplicity of notation, L(xi|hi, yi) and L(p|hr, yr) will be
denoted by Li and Lr, respectively, in what follows.
Extension to multiple relays:
If there are R relays, the above decision rule can be applied to each relay and decision can be
made individually on each relay.
4.4 Probabilities of False Alarm and Miss Detection
In this section we drive the probability of false alarm PFA and the probability of miss
detection PMD. The derivation follows from [54]. We first find PFA for the case when there
are two sources and then extend the result for K sources. In section 4.7, we generalize the
derivation for the case when the destination is equipped with nr antennas and T tracing bits
are used. The probability of false alarm is defined as
PFA = P (zˆ = −1|z = +1), (4.11)
and the probability of miss detection is defined as
PMD = P (zˆ = +1|z = −1), (4.12)
The error probability in estimating z is given by
PEz = P (zˆ = −1|z = +1)P (z = −1) + P (zˆ = +1|z = −1)P (z = −1)
= PFAP (z = −1) + PMDP (z = −1) (4.13)
For binary symmetric channel (BSC), PFA = PMD. Therefore
PFA = PEz (4.14)
From (4.7) and (4.10), we have
sign(zˆ) =sign (L(p|hr, yr)) .sign (L(x1|h1, y1))
.sign (L(x2|h2, y2)) (4.15)
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which is equivalent to
zˆ = x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ p˜ (4.16)
where x˜i is the estimated values of xi given yi only and p˜ is the estimated value of p given yr
only. The error probability of estimating z is given by
PEz = P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 = x2, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 6= x2, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 = x2, p˜ 6= p)
+P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 6= x2, p˜ 6= p)
(4.17)
But
P (x˜i 6= xi) = 1
2
[
1−
√
γs
1 + γs
]
, i = 1, 2 (4.18)
and
P (p˜ 6= p) = 1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
]
(4.19)
Assuming that all channels are independent, substitution from (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.17)
yields
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
γs
1 + γs
]
(4.20)
Following the same procedure, we can calculate PFA when K = 3 as follows
PFA = P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 = x2, x˜3 = x3, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 6= x2, x˜3 = x3, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 = x2, x˜3 6= x3, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 = x2, x˜3 = x3, p˜ 6= p)
+P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 6= x2, x˜3 6= x3, p˜ = p)
+P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 6= x2, x˜3 = x3, p˜ 6= p)
+P (x˜1 6= x1, x˜2 = x2, x˜3 6= x3, p˜ 6= p)
+P (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 6= x2, x˜3 6= x3, p˜ 6= p)
(4.21)
Substitution from (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.21) yields
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Table 4.2 Code book for MAP decoder without zˆ
cr0 000
cr1 011
cr2 101
cr3 110
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
(
γs
1 + γs
)3/2]
(4.22)
It follows from (4.20) and (4.22) and by induction that the probability of false alarm for
K sources is given by [55]
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
(
γs
1 + γs
)K/2]
(4.23)
4.5 Decoding Schemes
In this section, we will consider four decoding schemes. The four schemes differ in terms
of whether the receiver is aware of the misbehaving activity and how to utilize the knowledge
of zˆ.
4.5.1 MAP Decoder Without zˆ
We consider the case where the estimation of relay misbehavior zˆ is not available at the
decoder. Therefore, the decoder assumes that the relay is well-behaving i.e. z = +1. Therefore,
the decoder considers (x1, x2, pt) as a valid codeword, where pt = x1⊕x2 is the true parity bit,
and finds the most probable (closest) codeword given a received vector. Table 4.2 shows the
code book for the conventional decoder.
4.5.2 MAP Decoder With zˆ
We consider the case where the estimation of z is available at the decoder. In this case, the
MAP decoder considers (x1, x2, pt⊕zˆ) as a valid codeword and finds the most probable (closest)
codeword given a received vector. Therefore, if false alarm (zˆ = −1 given z = +1) occurs, then
the decoder considers (x1, x2,−pt) as a valid codeword while (x1, x2, pt) is valid. Similarly, if
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Table 4.3 Code book for MAP decoder with zˆ
zˆ = +1 zˆ = −1
cr0 000 001
cr1 011 010
cr2 101 100
cr3 110 111
miss detection (zˆ = +1 given z = −1) occurs, then the decoder considers (x1, x2, pt) as a valid
codeword while (x1, x2,−pt) is valid. In case a wrong parity bit is applied, the reliability of
decoding will be decreased. The codebook for this decoder is shown in Table 4.3. The decoder
selects the most probable codeword in the second column if zˆ = +1 and that in the third
column if zˆ = −1.
4.5.3 MAP Decoder With P (z)
The MAP decoder selects the codeword c that maximizes P (z|y), i.e.
cˆ = argmax
ci
P (ci|y) (4.24)
Applying Bayes theorem to (4.24) yields
cˆ = argmax
ci
P (y|ci)P (ci)
P (y)
= argmax
ci
P (y|ci)P (ci) (4.25)
This requires the a prior probability P (ci) which depends on P (z). For the codebook
shown in Table 4.4, the probability P (ci) is given by
P (ci) =

P (z=+1)
4 , for i = 0, 1, 2, 3
P (z=−1)
4 , for i =, 4, 5, 6, 7
(4.26)
If we let xi be the modulated signal corresponding to the codeword ci, i.e.
xi = [
√
Es(−1)ci1
√
Es(−1)ci2
√
Es(−1)ci3 ], where cij is the j-th bit in the i-th codeword, then
P (y|ci) = 1
(πN0)
3/2
e−||y−Hxi||
2/N0 (4.27)
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Table 4.4 Codebook for MAP decoder
z = +1
c0 000
c1 011
c2 101
c3 110
z = −1
c4 001
c5 010
c6 100
c7 111
where
H =

h1
√
d−m1 0 0
0 h2
√
d−m2 0
0 0 hr
√
d−mr
 (4.28)
An estimate of P (z = −1) may be obtained from zˆ. Define gt as
gt =
 1, if zˆt = −10, if zˆt = +1 (4.29)
where t is the time index. Then it follows from the law of large numbers (LLN) that an estimate
of P (z = −1) at time t can be aproximated by
P (zt = −1) ≈ 1
L
L−1∑
i=0
gt (4.30)
where L is the averaging window length.
4.5.4 Genie-aided Decoder
Genie-aided decoder assumes the availability of perfect side information regarding z, i.e.
zˆ = z. Therefore, the decoder considers (x1, x2,−pt) as a valid codeword when codewords are
generated as (x1, x2,−pt) and, similarly, (x1, x2, pt) as a valid codeword when codewords are
generated as (x1, x2, pt). This corresponds to the case of fully cooperative relay, and serves as
a reference for performance comparison with other decoders.
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4.6 Probability of Decoding Error
In this section, we drive the union bound on the probability of decoding error for the
decoding schemes discussed in Section 4.5. We also drive the bit error probability of the MAP
decoder as a function of log likelihood ratio.
4.6.1 MAP Decoder Without zˆ
When zˆ is not available, the decoder assumes z = +1. Then, all codewords are equi-
probable, and, therefore, the MAP decoder is equivalent to the ML decoder or the minimum
distance decoder. In this section, we drive the union bound on the word error probability. The
word error probability is given by
PE = p(e|z = +1)p(z = +1) + p(e|z = −1)p(z = −1) (4.31)
Without loss of generality, assume ct0 is transmitted. First, consider the case when z = +1.
Then the union bound on the probability of decoding error is given by
p(e|z = +1) ≤ p(ct0 → cr1 |z = +1) + p(ct0 → cr2 |z = +1) + p(ct0 → cr3 |z = +1) (4.32)
The received vector at the destination is given by
y = Hx0 + n (4.33)
where
H =

h1 0 0
0 h2 0
0 0 hr
 (4.34)
where the pass loss is considered in the channel gains and x0 is the transmitted vector corre-
sponding to the codeword ct0 . When z = +1 we have
x0 =

x00
x01
x02
 =

√
Es
√
Es
√
Er
 (4.35)
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p(ct0 → cr1 |z = +1,h) = p(||y−Hr1||2 < ||y−Hr0||2) (4.36)
where ri is the modulated signal corresponding to cri . For example
r1 =

r10
r11
r12
 =

√
Es
−√Es
−√Er
 (4.37)
When z = +1, ri = xi.
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ,h) = p(||Hx0 + n−Hr1||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
= p(||H (x0 − r1) + n||2 < ||n||2)
= p
(
(< n, H(x0 − r1) >) ||H(x0 − r1)||2/2
)
(4.38)
where
< n, H(x0 − r1) >=
2∑
i=0
hi(x0i − r1i)ni (4.39)
is a random variable with zero mean and variance N02 ||H(x0− r1)||2 = N02
∑2
i=0 |hi(x00− r10)|2
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = +1,h) = Q
( ||H(x0 − r1)||√
2N0
)
= Q
(
2
√
h22Es + h
2
rEr√
2N0
)
(4.40)
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = +1) ≤
1
(1 + γs) (1 + γr)
(4.41)
similarly, we can write
p(ct0 → cr2 |z = +1) ≤
1
(1 + γs) (1 + γr)
(4.42)
and
p(ct0 → cr3 |z = +1) ≤
1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.43)
If γs = γr, then
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p(e|z = zˆ) ≤ 1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.44)
Next, consider the case of z = −1 where ri 6= xi. The union bound on the probability of
decoding error is given by
p(e|z = −1) ≤ p(ct0 → cr1 |z = −1) + p(ct0 → cr2 |z = −1) + p(ct0 → cr3 |z = −1) (4.45)
where
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = −1,h) =p(||Hx0 + n−Hr1||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
=p(||H (x0 − r1) + n||2 < ||H (x0 − r0) + n||2)
=p
((
< n, H(x0 − r1) > + ||H(x0 − r1)||
2
2
)
<
(
< n, H(x0 − r0) > + ||H(x0 − r0)||
2
2
))
=p
(
h2
√
Esn2 + h
2
2Es < hr
√
Ernr + h
2
rEr
)
=p
(
h2
√
Esn2 − hr
√
Ernr < h
2
rEr − h22Es
)
(4.46)
The left hand side of (4.46) is a Gaussian RV with zero mean and variance N02 (h
2
2Es+h
2
rEr).
Hence,
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = −1,h) = Q
(
h22Es − h2rEr√
(h22Es + h
2
rEr)N0/2
)
(4.47)
If Es = Er and h2 = hr, then
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ,h) =
1
2
(4.48)
By simulations, it can be shown that
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ) ≈
1
2
(4.49)
Similarly,
p(ct0 → cr2 |z 6= zˆ) ≈
1
2
(4.50)
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p(ct0 → cr3 |z = −1,h) =p(||Hx0 + n−Hr3||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
=p
(||H (x0 − r3) + n||2 < ||H (x0 − r0) + n||2)
=p
((
< n, H(x0 − r3) > + ||H(x0 − r3)||
2
2
)
<
(
< n, H(x0 − r0) > + ||H(x0 − r0)||
2
2
))
=p
(
h1
√
Esn1 + h2
√
Esn2 > Es
(
h21 + h
2
2
))
=Q
(√
h21Es + h
2
2Es√
N0/2
)
(4.51)
p(ct0 → cr3 |z = −1) ≤
1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.52)
p(e|z = −1) ≤ 1 + 1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.53)
It follows from (4.45), (4.49), (4.50), and (4.52) that
p(e|z = −1) ≤ 1 (4.54)
and therefore
PE ≤ P (z = +1)
(1 + γs)
2 + P (z = −1) (4.55)
This shows that is an error floor due to the term P (z = −1) in (4.55).
4.6.2 MAP Decoder With zˆ
When zˆ is available at the decoder, the MAP decoder considers (x1, x2, pt ⊕ zˆ) as a valid
codeword and finds the most probable (closest) codeword given a received vector. Therefore,
the minimum distance decoder chooses the closest codeword among the four codewords listed
in the second column of Table 4.3 when zˆ = +1 and chooses the closest codeword among the
four codewords listed in the third column when zˆ = −1. In this section, we find the ML union
bound of the word error probability. The word error probability is given by
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PE = p(e|z = zˆ)p(z = zˆ) + p(e|z 6= zˆ)p(z 6= zˆ) (4.56)
where
p(z 6= zˆ) = p(zˆ = −1|z = +1)p(z = +1) + p(zˆ = +1|z = −1)p(z = −1)
= PFAp(z = +1) + PMDp(z = −1)
= PFA (p(z = +1) + p(z = −1)) = PFA (4.57)
Substituting from (4.57) into (4.56) yields
PE = p(e|z = zˆ)(1− PFA) + p(e|z 6= zˆ)PFA (4.58)
Without loss of generality, consider the case when ct0 is transmitted, we will drive the union
bound on the error probability. First, consider the case when z = zˆ = +1
p(e|z = zˆ) ≤ p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ) + p(ct0 → cr2 |z = zˆ) + p(ct0 → cr3 |z = zˆ) (4.59)
The vector received at the destination is given by
y = Hx0 + n (4.60)
where
H =

h1
√
d−m1 0 0
0 h2
√
d−m2 0
0 0 hr
√
d−mr
 (4.61)
and x0 is the transmitted vector which corresponds to the codeword ct0 i.e.
x0 =

x00
x01
x02
 =

√
Es
√
Es
√
Es
 (4.62)
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ,h) = p(||y−Hr1||2 < ||y−Hr0||2) (4.63)
where ri is the modulated signal corresponding to cri . When zˆ = +1
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r1 =

r10
r11
r12
 =

√
Es
−√Es
−√Er
 (4.64)
When z = zˆ, ri = xi.
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ,h) = p(||Hx0 + n−Hr1||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
= p(||H (x0 − r1) + n||2 < ||n||2)
= p
(
(< n, H(x0 − r1) >) ||H(x0 − r1)||2/2
)
(4.65)
where
< n, H(x0 − r1) >=
2∑
i=0
hi(x0i − r1i)ni (4.66)
is a random variable with zero mean and variance N02 ||H(x0 − r1)||2 = N02
∑2
i=0 |hi(x00 −
r10)|2
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ,h) = Q
( ||H(x0 − r1)||√
2N0
)
= Q
(
2
√
h22Es + h
2
rEr√
2N0
)
(4.67)
p(ct0 → cr1 |z = zˆ) ≤
1
(1 + γs) (1 + γr)
(4.68)
similarly, we can write
p(ct0 → cr2 |z = zˆ) ≤
1
(1 + γs) (1 + γr)
(4.69)
and
p(ct0 → cr3 |z = zˆ) ≤
1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.70)
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If γs = γr, then
p(e|z = zˆ) ≤ 1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.71)
Now, consider the case when z 6= zˆ
p(e|z 6= zˆ) ≤ p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ) + p(ct0 → cr2 |z 6= zˆ) + p(ct0 → cr3 |z 6= zˆ) (4.72)
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ,h) = p(||y−Hr1||2 < ||y−Hr0||2) (4.73)
When z 6= zˆ, ri 6= xi.
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ,h) =p(||Hx0 + n−Hr1||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
=p(||H (x0 − r1) + n||2 < ||H (x0 − r0) + n||2)
=p
((
< n, H(x0 − r1) > + ||H(x0 − r1)||
2
2
)
<
(
< n, H(x0 − r0) > + ||H(x0 − r0)||
2
2
))
=p
(
h2
√
Esn2 + h
2
2Es < hr
√
Ernr + h
2
rEr
)
=p
(
h2
√
Esn2 − hr
√
Ernr < h
2
rEr − h22Es
)
(4.74)
the left hand side is Gaussian RV with zero mean and variance N02 (h
2
2Es + h
2
rEr). Then,
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ,h) = Q
(
h22Es − h2rEr√
(h22Es + h
2
rEr)N0/2
)
(4.75)
Using simulations
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ) ≈
1
2
(4.76)
Intuitively, if Es = Er and h2 = hr, then
p(ct0 → cr1 |z 6= zˆ,h) =
1
2
(4.77)
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Similarly,
p(ct0 → cr2 |z 6= zˆ) ≈
1
2
(4.78)
p(ct0 → cr3 |z 6= zˆ,h) =p(||Hx0 + n−Hr3||2 < ||Hx0 + n−Hr0||2)
=p
(||H (x0 − r3) + n||2 < ||H (x0 − r0) + n||2)
=p
((
< n, H(x0 − r3) > + ||H(x0 − r3)||
2
2
)
<
(
< n, H(x0 − r0) > + ||H(x0 − r0)||
2
2
))
=p
(
h1
√
Esn1 + h2
√
Esn2 > Es
(
h21 + h
2
2
))
=Q
(√
h21Es + h
2
2Es√
N0/2
)
(4.79)
p(ct0 → cr3 |z 6= zˆ) ≤
1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.80)
p(e|z 6= zˆ) ≤ 1 + 1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.81)
But error probability is less than 1, then
p(e|z 6= zˆ) ≤ 1 (4.82)
PE ≤ 1− PFA
(1 + γs)
2 + PFA (4.83)
4.6.3 MAP Decoder With P (z)
In this subsection, we first drive the union bound on the bit error probability. Then, we
find the bit error probability as a function of LLR
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4.6.3.1 The Union Bound
The codebook of the MAP decoder is given in table 4.4. The union bound on the word
error probability is given by
PE ≤
7∑
i=0
7∑
j=0
j 6=i
P (ci → cj) (4.84)
where the a priori probability of the codeword ci is given by
P (ci) =

P (z=+1)
4 , for i = 0, 1, 2, 3
P (z=+1)
4 , for i = 4, 5, 6, 7
(4.85)
For mathematical traceability, we assume that Es = Er = E. Let’s define P1, P2, and P3
as follows:
P1 = P (ci → cj) if ci differs from cj in one bit. For example c0, c4.
P2 = P (ci → cj) if ci differs from cj in two bit. For example c0, c1.
P3 = P (ci → cj) if ci differs from cj in one bit. For example c0, c7.
The union bound in (4.84) can be written as
PE ≤ 3P1 + 3P2 + P3 (4.86)
Now, consider xi is the transmitted vector which corresponds to the codeword ci. For
example
x5 =

x50
x51
x52
 =

+
√
Es
−√Es
+
√
Es
 (4.87)
The MAP decoder finds an estimate of x as follows:
xˆ = argmax
x
1
(πN0)3/2
e
− ||y−Hx||2
N0 P (x) (4.88)
where x ∈ {x0,x1, · · · ,x7} and P (xi) = P (ci), i = 0, 1, · · · , 7. After some mathematical
manipulations, we can write (4.88) as
xˆ = argmin
x
(||y−Hx||2 −N0 log(P (x))) (4.89)
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It’s clear from (4.86) that the error probability is not a function of the transmitted code-
word. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the codeword c0 was transmitted. Then
P1 =P (c0 → c4) (4.90)
=Eh [P (c0 → c4|h)] (4.91)
The probability P (c0 → c4|h) is given by
P (c0 → c4|h) = P
(||y−Hx4||2 −N0 log(P (x4)) < ||y−Hx0||2 −N0 log(P (x0)))
= P
(
||H(x0 − x4) + n||2 −N0 log P (z = +1)
P (z = −1) < ||n||
2
)
= P
(||H(x0 − x4) + n||2 −N0L(z) < ||n||2)
= P
(
(< n,H(x0 − x4) >) > ||H(x0 − x4)||
2
2
+
N0
2
L(z)
)
= Q
(
2h23E + (N0/2)L(z)√
2N0h23E
)
= Q
(√
2h23γ +
1
2L(z)√
2h23γ
)
(4.92)
where γ = E/N0 and L(z) = log(P (z = +1)/P (z = −1)). In order to find P1, we average (4.92)
over the distribution of h23.
P1 = Eh23
[
Q
(√
2h23γ +
1
2L(z)√
2h23γ
)]
(4.93)
Since h3 follows the Rayleigh distribution, the distribution of h
2
3 would be exponential. After
averaging (4.92) over the exponential distribution we have
P1 =
1
2
[
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
]
e
−L(z)
2
(1+
√
1+ 1
γ
)
(4.94)
The proof of (4.94) is provided in Appendix B. Similarly, we can find P2 as follows
P2 =P (c0 → c1) (4.95)
=Eh [P (c0 → c1|h)] (4.96)
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The probability P (c0 → c1|h) is given by
P (c0 → c1|h) = P
(||y−Hx1||2 −N0 log(P (x1)) < ||y−Hx0||2 −N0 log(P (x0)))
= P
(
||H(x0 − x1) + n||2 −N0 log P (z = +1)
P (z = +1)
< ||n||2
)
= P
(
(< n,H(x0 − x1) >) > ||H(x0 − x1)||
2
2
)
= Q
(
2
√
h22E + h
2
3E√
2N0
)
(4.97)
Averaging (4.97) over the joint distribution of h22 and h
3
3 yields
P2 =
1
2
[
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
]2(
1 +
1
2
√
γ
1 + γ
)
(4.98)
Since the distance between c0 and c7 is three, we can neglect the contribution of P3 in the
union bound calculations.
At high SNR, (4.94) is bounded by
P1 ≤ e
−L(z)
4γ
(4.99)
and (4.98) is bounded by
P2 ≤ 1
16γ2
(4.100)
Therefore the union bound on the word error probability is given by
PE ≤e
−L(z)
4γ
+
1
16γ2
=
1
16γ2
(
1 + 4γe−L(z)
)
(4.101)
Hence,
PE ≤

1
16γ2
, if L(z) >> log(4γ)
e−L(z)
4γ , if L(z) << log(4γ)
(4.102)
This shows that the diversity order is two when the attack probability P (z = −1) is small,
i.e. L(z) is large.
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4.6.3.2 Bit error probability as a function of LLR
When the destination uses the MAP decoder to estimate the transmitted bits, the proba-
bility of bit error of the first source is given by
P (xˆ1 6= x1|y) = 1
1 + e|Λ|
(4.103)
where
Λ = L (x1|y1, y2, yr)
= log
P (x1 = 1|y1, y2, yr)
P (x1 = −1|y1, y2, yr)
= log
P (y1, y2, yr|x1 = 1)
P (y1, y2, yr|x1 = −1)
= log
P (y1|x1 = 1)P (y2, yr|x1 = 1)
P (y1|x1 = −1)P (y2, yr|x1 = −1)
= L (x1|y1) + L (x1|y2, yr) (4.104)
Now, we need to calculate the log likelihood ratio of x1 given y2 and yr. Since y2 is the
received signal when x2 is transmitted from the second source and yr is the received signal
when p is transmitted from the relay, we can calculate L (x2 ⊕ p| y2, yr) as follows
L (x2 ⊕ p|y2, yr) ≈ sign (L2) · sign (Lr) ·min {|L2|, |Lr|} (4.105)
Let f = x2 ⊕ p. Since p = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ z, then f = x1 ⊕ z. We can write
L (f |y2, yr) = L (x1 ⊕ z|y2, yr)
≈ sign (L2) · sign (Lr) ·min {|L2|, |Lr|} (4.106)
81
The log likelihood ratio of x1 given y2 and yr is given by
L (x1|y2, yr) = log P (x1 = +1|y2, yr)
P (x1 = −1|y2, yr)
= log
P (f ⊕ z = +1|y2, yr)
P (f ⊕ z = −1|y2, yr)
= log
P (f ⊕ z = +1|y2, yr, z = +1)Pz=+1 + P (f ⊕ z = +1|y2, yr, z = −1)Pz=−1
P (f ⊕ z = −1|y2, yr, z = +1)Pz=+1 + P (f ⊕ z = −1|y2, yr, z = −1)Pz=−1
= log
P (f = +1|y2, yr, z = +1)Pz=+1 + P (f = −1|y2, yr, z = −1)Pz=−1
P (f = −1|y2, yr, z = +1)Pz=+1 + P (f = +1|y2, yr, z = −1)Pz=−1
= log
P (f = +1|y2, yr)P (z = +1) + P (f = −1|y2, yr)P (z = −1)
P (f = −1|y2, yr)P (z = +1) + P (f = +1|y2, yr)P (z = −1)
= log
P (f = +1|y2, yr) /P (f = −1|y2, yr)P (z = +1) + P (z = −1)
P (z = +1) + P (f = +1|y2, yr) /P (f = −1|y2, yr)P (z = −1)
= log
eL(f |y2,yr)P (z = +1) + P (z = −1)
P (z = +1) + eL(f |y2,yr)P (z = −1) (4.107)
Λ = L (x1|y1) + L (x1|y2, yr)
= L (x1|y1) + log e
L(x2⊕p|y2,yr)P (z = +1) + P (z = −1)
P (z = +1) + eL(x2⊕p|y2,yr)P (z = −1) (4.108)
P (xˆ1 6= x1|y) = 1
1 + e|Λ|
(4.109)
Special Cases:
Case I: P (z = +1) = 1, P (z = −1) = 0
L (x1|y2, yr) = log e
L(f |y2,yr) × 1 + 0
1 + eL(f |y2,yr) × 0
= log eL(f |y2,yr)
= L (f |y2, yr)
= L (x2 ⊕ p|y2, yr) (4.110)
This is the case when the relay node is fully cooperative which provides the minimum error
rate.
Case II: P (z = +1) = 0, P (z = −1) = 1
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L (x1|y2, yr) = log e
L(f |y2,yr) × 0 + 1
0 + eL(f |y2,yr) × 1
= log e−L(f |y2,yr)
= −L (f |y2, yr)
= −L (x2 ⊕ p|y2, yr) (4.111)
This is the case when the relay node inverts every parity bit it generates. The destination
should invert back every bit received from the relay node. The error rate performance in this
case is the same as that of case I.
Case III: P (z = +1) = 0.5, P (z = −1) = 0.5
L (x1|y2, yr) = log e
L(f |y2,yr) × 0.5 + 0.5
0.5 + eL(f |y2,yr) × 0.5
= 0 (4.112)
In this case the relay node injects +1 and −1 with equal probability. This type of malicious
attack eliminates the correlation between the data transmitted from the relay node and what
is received from the source. Therefore, the received signal at the destination from the relay
node will provide no information about x1 or x2.
4.6.4 Genie-aided Decoder
Genie-aided decoder assumes the availability of perfect side information regarding z, i.e.
zˆ = z. Therefore, P (zˆ 6= z) = 0 and P (zˆ = z) = 1. The ML union bound on the word error
probability can be found by setting P (zˆ 6= z) = 0 and P (zˆ = z) = 1 in (4.83) as follows
PE ≤ 1
(1 + γs)
2 (4.113)
We can also find the bit error probability as a function of the log likelihood ratio as follows
P (xˆ1 6= x1) = 1
1 + e|Λ|
(4.114)
where
Λ = L (x1|y1) + L (x1|y2, yr) (4.115)
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Figure 4.2 Probability of false alarm against number of sources for γs = γr
= 10dB
and
L (x1|y2, yr) =
 L (x2 ⊕ p|y2, yr) , if z = +1−L (x2 ⊕ p|y2, yr) , if z = −1 (4.116)
Then
P (xˆ1 6= x1) = 1
1 + e|L(x1|y1)+z.L(x2⊕p|y2,yr)|
(4.117)
4.7 Enhancing MAP Detection
In this section we propose three methods to enhance the MAP detection.
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4.7.1 Tracing Bit Aided MAP detection
Figure 4.2 shows the probability of false alarm PFA against the number of sources K.
We see that PFA increases as the number of sources increases. The MAP detection can be
made more accurate by inserting a number of tracing bits in the data stream at the source
in a cryptographically secure manner. Tracing bits are reference bits which are know at the
destination. If T out of K source nodes send tracing bits it’s easy to show that the probability
of false alarm as a function of K and T is given by [55]
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
(
γs
1 + γs
)(K−T )/2]
(4.118)
(4.118) shows how the transmission of tracing bits by T source nodes improves the per-
formance of the MAP detection scheme. As a special case, consider the scenario when all
K bits are know at the destination, i.e. T = K. Without loss of generality, let’s assume
x1⊕x2⊕ · · ·⊕xK = 1. Then the parity bit sent by the relay is p = x1⊕x2⊕ · · ·⊕xK ⊕ z = z.
In this case the false alarm (zˆ = −1 given z = 1) will occur if the relay-to-destination channel
is in error, i.e. the probability of false alarm is given by
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
]
(4.119)
Now, consider the case when each source transmits t tracing bits for every k information
bits. Hence, the probability that a specific bit from a source being a tracing bit is t/n where
n = k + t. In order to calculate the average probability of false alarm, we first consider the
case of two sources and then we generalize the solution for K sources.
Two sources
If b1 is the bits of the first source and b2 is the bit of second source then there are four
possible events each occurs with a specific probability as follows:
1. (Both b1 and b2 are tracing bits) with probability t
2/n2
2. (b1 is a tracing bit and b2 is not) with probability t(n− t)/n2
3. (b2 is a tracing bit and b1 is not) with probability t(n− t)/n2
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4. (Neither b1 nor b2 is a tracing bit) with probability (n− t)2/n2
Accordingly, the average probability of false alarm is given by
PFA =
1
2
[(
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
γs
1 + γs
)
(n− t)2
n2
+2
(
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
γs
1 + γs
)
(n− t)t
n2
+
(
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
)
t2
n2
] (4.120)
K sources
When there are K sources, it can be shown that the average probability of false alarm is
PFA =
1
2
K∑
T=0
(
1−
√
γr
1 + γr
(
γs
1 + γs
)(K−T )/2)(K
T
)
(n− t)K−T tT
nK
(4.121)
For further simplification of (4.121), let’s assume αs =
√
γs/(1 + γs), αr =
√
γr/(1 + γr), and
ptn = t/n. Hence
PFA =
1
2
K∑
T=0
(
1− αrαK−Ts
)(K
T
)
(1− ptn)K−T pTtn
=
1
2
K∑
T=0
(
K
T
)
(1− ptn)K−T pTtn −
1
2
αr
K∑
T=0
(
K
T
)
αK−Ts (1− ptn)K−T pTtn
=
1
2
− 1
2
pKtnαr
K∑
T=0
(
K
T
)
αK−Ts
(
1
ptn
− 1
)K−T
=
1
2
− 1
2
pKtnαr
K∑
T=0
(
K
T
)(
αs
ptn
− αs
)K−T
=
1
2
− 1
2
pKtnαr
K∑
T=0
(
K
T
)(
αs
ptn
− αs + 1− 1
)K−T
=
1
2
− 1
2
pKtnαr
(
αs
ptn
− αs + 1
)K
(4.122)
Substituting back for the values of αs, αr, and ptn yields
PFA =
1
2
[
1−
(
t
n
+
(
1− t
n
)√
γs
1 + γs
)K√ γr
1 + γr
]
(4.123)
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4.7.2 Channel Coding Aided MAP detection
Another method to increase the accuracy of the MAP detection scheme is to use channel
coding. That is because the channel coding corrects some errors in the data received from the
sources and accordingly the bit error probability of the i-th source bits (P (x˜i 6= xi)) decreases.
Since the misbehaving relay node injects the falsified data randomly, the data comes through
the relay-destination channel may not be consistent with the used channel code. Therefore,
the decoding of the relay bits may be harmful.
Each source encodes it’s data using a specific (n, k) code where k is the number of informa-
tion bits, n is the code length, and (n− k) is the number of parity bits. The detection of the
misbehaving activity of the relay node is performed at the destination as follows. First, the
destination decodes the data coming from the source nodes in order to correct channel errors.
Then, the MAP detector is used to find zˆ.
If the code (n, k) can correct up to e errors, the probability on decoding error of a the i-th
source bit is given by
Pci =
n∑
j=e+1
j
n
(
n
j
)
P jbi(1− Pbi)n−j (4.124)
where the probability of the i-th source bit error Pbi is given in (4.18). Assuming perfect
power control such that all source-to-destination channels have the same average SNR then
Pb1 = Pb2 = · · · = Pbn = Pb and Pc1 = Pc2 = · · · = Pcn = Pc. If the number of sources is K
then the probability of false alarm is given by
PFA = (1− Pbr)
K∑
i=1
Step 2
(
K
i
)
P ic(1− Pc)K−i + Pbr
K∑
i=0
Step 2
(
K
i
)
P ic(1− Pc)K−i (4.125)
4.7.3 Multiple Antennas Aided MAP detection
If the destination is equipped with nr antennas and uses MRC to combine the received
signals the probability of bit error of the i-th source is given
Pbi =
(
1− Γi
2
)nr nr−1∑
j=0
(
nr − 1 + j
j
)(
1 + Γi
2
)
(4.126)
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where
Γi =
√
γi
1 + γi
(4.127)
and the probability of bit error of the relay node is given
Pbr =
(
1− Γr
2
)nr nr−1∑
j=0
(
nr − 1 + j
j
)(
1 + Γr
2
)
(4.128)
where
Γr =
√
γr
1 + γr
(4.129)
Assuming that all source bits have the same receive SNR, i.e., γi = γs, the probability of
false alarm is given by
PFA = (1− Pbr)
K−T∑
i=1
Step 2
(
K − T
i
)
P ibi(1− Pbi)K−T−i + Pbr
K−T∑
i=0
Step 2
(
K − T
i
)
P ibi(1− Pbi)K−T−i
(4.130)
4.8 Detection of Misbehaving behavior in Multiple Access Relay Networks
with M-ary Modulation
In this section, we present a MAP detection scheme which can handle the case of M -ary
modulation to detect misbehaving activity of the relay node. Consider a multi-access relay
network composed of two sources, one relay, and one destination as shown in Figure 4.3. The
relay overhears the symbols sent by the sources (possibly with some errors), encodes them, and
forwards the encoded symbol to the destination. We assume that all symbols are sent through
orthogonal Rayleigh fading channels with additive white Gaussian noise and path loss, and
each node is equipped with single antenna.
Let xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1} denote the data symbol of the i-th source, i = 1, 2, and xri
denote the overheard data symbol by the relay where M = 2b and b is the number of bits
per symbol. The symbol xi is modulated using M -ary modulation. The relay combines the
overheard symbols and produces a coded (parity) symbol. The linear combination at the relay
node is done over GF (2b). The parity symbol generated at the relay node is given by
p = xr1 + x
r
2 + f (4.131)
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Figure 4.3 System Model for the M -ary Modulation case
where f ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1} denotes the injected symbol by the relay to corrupt the com-
munication and operation “+” is modulo-M addition. If f 6= 0, false symbol is injected, and
if f = 0, no false symbol is injected.
Let ei ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1} be the error value between the i-th source and the relay, i.e.
xri = xi + ei, where ei 6= 0 means xri 6= xi, i.e. xi is received in error at the relay, and ei = 0
means xri = xi. Then, (4.131) can be written as
p = x1 + x2 + e1 + e2 + f
= x1 + x2 + z (4.132)
where
z = e1 + e2 + f (4.133)
captures the error events on the source-to-relay channels as well as the false data injection by
the relay. Note that, ”+” in 4.131, 4.132, and 4.133 is the addition operation in GF (M).
The destination is interested in finding z whether z is equal to 0 (well-behaving) or belongs
to {1, 2, · · · ,M − 1} (misbehaving). The maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision rule which
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Table 4.5 Bit representation of 4-ary symbol
symbol b2 b1
s0 = 0 0 0
s1 = 1 0 1
s2 = 2 1 0
s3 = 3 1 1
minimizes the probability of incorrect decision is based on the LLR of z. Because of the
complexity in calculating direct value of the LLR of z, we propose a simple procedure to
estimate z by calculating the LLR’s of its individual bits. Let Lij denote the the LLR of the
j-th bit of the symbol received from the i-th source given yi and hi, i.e.,
Lij =L(bj |yi, hi)
= log
P (bj = 0|yi, hi)
P (bj = 1)|yi, hi) (4.134)
where i = 1, 2, r and j = 1, 2, · · · , b.
As an example, consider the case when M = 4 which means that each symbol consists of
two bits, i.e., b = 2. Table 4.5 represnts the symbol structure of the 4-ary case. The LLR of
the second bit of the of the symbol received from the the first source is given by
L21 =L(b1|y2, h2)
= log
P (b1 = 0|y2, h2)
P (b1 = 1|y2, h2)
= log
P (s0|y2, h2) + P (s2|y2, h2)
P (s1|y2, h2) + P (s3|y2, h2) (4.135)
Generally, we can write
Lij = log
∑M−1
m=0
bj=0
P (sm|yi, hi)∑M−1
m=0
bj=1
P (sm|yi, hi)
= log
∑M−1
m=0
bj=0
P (yi|sm, hi)P (sm)/P (yi|hi)∑M−1
m=0
bj=1
P (yi|sm, hi)P (sm)/P (yi|hi)
= log
∑M−1
m=0
bj=0
P (yi|sm, hi)∑M−1
m=0
bj=1
P (yi|sm, hi)
(4.136)
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where P (sm) = 1/M for all m = {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} and P (yi|hi) is common in the numerator
and the denominator. The probability of Yi given sm and hi is given by
P (yi|sm, hi) = 1√
πN0
e
− |yi−hixm|
2
N0 (4.137)
where xm is the M -ary modulated signal which corresponds to sm. Substituting from (4.137)
into (4.136) yields
Lij = log
∑M−1
m=0
bj=0
e
− |yi−hixm|
2
N0
∑M−1
m=0
bj=1
e
− |yi−hixm|2
N0
(4.138)
The terms of the summation in both numerator and denominator of (4.138) may tend to
zero because of a large negative exponent. Therefore Lij would be an unknown quantity. Lij
in (4.138) can be approximated by
Lij ≈ log
max
{
e
− |yi−hixm|
2
N0
}M−1
m=0
bj=0
max
{
e
− |yi−hixm|2
N0
}M−1
m=0
bj=1
=
1
N0
[
min
{|yi − hixm|2}M−1m=0
bj=1
−min{|yi − hixm|2}M−1m=0
bj=0
]
(4.139)
In order to find the LLR’s of bits of z, we first find the relation between the bits of z and
the bits of the transmitted symbols from the source and relay nodes. Let bzj be the j-th bit of
z and bij , i = 1, 2, r be the j-th bit of the symbol transmitted from the source or relay nodes.
For 4-ary case, bits of z are given by
bz1 = b11 + b21 + br1 (4.140)
and
bz2 = xor (b11, b12, b21, b22, br2, v1, v2) (4.141)
where v1 = b11.b21 and v2 = br1.(b11 + b21). The LLR of bits of bz1 is given by
Lz1 =L(bz1 |y,h)
= log
P (bz1 = 0)
P (bz1 = 1)
(4.142)
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Using the approximation of [70] to find the LLR of bz1 from (4.140) yields
Lz1 ≈ sign(L11) · sign(L21) · sign(L31) ·min{|L11|, |L21|, |L31|} (4.143)
Similarly, we can calculate the LLR of bz2 as follows
Lz1 ≈sign(L32) · sign(Lv1) · sign(Lv2) ·
∏
i=1,2
j=1,2
sign(Lij)
·min{|L11|, |L12|, |L21|, |L22|, |L32|, |Lv1 |, |Lv2 |} (4.144)
where
Lv1 =L(v1|y,h)
=L(b11 · b21|y,h)
= log
eL11eL21
1 + eL11 + eL21
≈L11 + L21 −max{0, L11, L21} (4.145)
and
Lv2 =L(v2|y,h)
=L(b21 · (b11 + b21)|y,h)
= log
eL31eL11,21
1 + eL31 + eL11,21
≈L21 + L11,21 −max{0, L31, L11,21} (4.146)
where
L11,21 ≈ sign(L11) · sign(L21)min{|L11|, |L21|} (4.147)
Now, we find bˆz1 and bz2 by making a hard decision on Lz1 and Lz2 respectively as follows
bˆz1 =
 0, if Lz1 ≥ 01, if Lz1 < 0 (4.148)
bˆz2 =
 0, if Lz2 ≥ 01, if Lz2 < 0 (4.149)
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4.8.1 Probability of False Alarm
In this section, we drive the probability of false alarm resulting from using the MAP
algorithm to detect misbehaving activity in the M -ary case. Let xin ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} is the
input to the channel and xout ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} is the output of the channel. The channel
is said to be symmetric if
P (xout = i|xin = j) = P (xout = j|xin = i) i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1} (4.150)
Assuming that all channels are symmetric, the probability of false alarm can be written as
PFA = P (zˆ 6= z) (4.151)
The estimated value of z is given by
zˆ = pˆ− xˆ1 − xˆ2 (4.152)
where − is the subtraction operation in GF (M) and pˆ, xˆ1, and xˆ2 are estimated values of the
symbols transmitted from the first source, the second source, and the relay node respectively.
Let ei be the error provided by the channel between the i-th source and the destination where
i = 1, 2, ep be the error provided by the channel between the relay and the destination, and ez
be the error in estimating z. Hence
z + ez = p+ ep − x1 − e1 − x2 − e2 (4.153)
Since p = x1 + x2 + z, the error in estimating z can be written as
ez = ep − e1 − e2 (4.154)
The probability of false alarm can be written as
PFA = P (ez 6= 0)
= 1− P (ez = 0)
= 1− P (ep − e1 − e2 = 0) (4.155)
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Table 4.6 All possible combinations of ep, e1, e2 that yields ez = 0 in the
case 4-ary
ep e1 e2 ez = ep − e1 − e2 = 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 2 2 0
0 3 3 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 2 3 0
1 3 2 0
2 0 2 0
2 1 3 0
2 2 0 0
2 3 1 0
3 0 3 0
3 1 2 0
3 2 1 0
3 3 0 0
To find a closed form expression for the probability of false alarm, let’s consider the 4-
ary example. The same procedure can be generalized to find the probability of false alarm
for M -ary case. Table 4.6 shows all possible values of ep, e1, and e2 at which ez = 0. For
mathematical traceability, we assume that all channels have the same average receive SNR γ.
Hence, P (ep = 0) = P (e1 = 0) = P (e2 = 0) = Pe. The probability of z = 0 is given by
P (z = 0) = (1− Pe)3 + 9P 2e (1− Pe) + 6P 3e
=1− 3Pe + 12P 2e − 4P 3e (4.156)
Hence, the probability of false alarm is given by
PFA = 3Pe − 12P 2e + 4P 3e (4.157)
In case of 4-QAM modulation, and for Rayleigh channel, the error probability Pe is given
by [44]
Pe ≈ 1−
√
γ
2 + γ
(4.158)
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Hence, the probability of false alarm is given by
PFA ≈ 3
(
1−
√
γ
2 + γ
)
− 12
(
1−
√
γ
2 + γ
)2
+ 4
(
1−
√
γ
2 + γ
)3
(4.159)
4.9 Estimation of Relay-Destination Channel
As described in the previous sections, the channel gains h1, h2, and hr are required for both
detection and decoding processes. The most common way of channel estimation is to insert
pilot symbols in the transmitted signal that are known to the destination, and to compare
the pilot symbols with corresponding received symbols. This method of channel estimation
requires the compliance of the sender nodes with the transmission protocol. For the case of
misbehaving relay, the relay node may send a falsified data instead of the actual pilot symbols
which results in an incorrect estimation of the channel between this relay and the destination
hr. In order to cope with this problem, the destination should rely on the relay when estimating
hr. Blind channel estimation (BCE) is an alternative method which can be used to find hr.
BCE does not require the use of pilot symbols and moreover it possesses desirable advantages
such as a better bandwidth efficiency. Many BCE methods in various types of communication
systems have been developed since the early 80s (see [81] and references therein).
Figure 4.4 shows the baseband representation of a digital communication system. The
communication channel is characterized as a linear time invariant (LTI) system which has a
finite impulse response (FIR) due to finite delay spread of the channel. The impulse response
h(t) is a cascade of the pulse shaping filter in the transmitter, the physical multipath fading
channel, and the receive filter. Assume the symbol interval of the input signal is T . The
output signal can be written as
y(t) = h(t) ∗ s(t) + w(t) (4.160)
where “*” denotes the convolution. When the output signal is sampled at the baud rate (i.e., at
the rate 1/T ), the system can be simplified as in Figure 4.4-(b), where the equivalent channel,
H(z), is a discrete LTI system. The received signal y(n) is a noise corrupted version of the
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Figure 4.4 Baseband representation of a digital communication channel.
(a) Analog model with a bandlimited channel impulse response
h(t); (b) Equivalent digital model with channel transfer function
H(z).
convolution of the input signal s(n) and the channel impulse response h(n) and it’s given by
y(n) = h(n) ∗ s(n) + w(n) (4.161)
Blind channel estimation seeks to estimate the channelH(z) without explicit knowledge of s(n).
Mathematically, it is similar to blind deconvolution problem in control or image processing
literature.
A simple method for blind channel estimation is using the second order statistics (SOS) or
higher order statistics (HOS). Consider the SOS case where the power spectral density of the
output signal is given by
Syy(z) = |H(z)|2Sss(z) + Sww(z) (4.162)
where Syy(z) =
∑
mE [y(n)y
∗(n−m)] z−m, Sss(z) =
∑
mE [s(n)s
∗(n−m)] z−m, and Sww(z)
=
∑
mE [w(n)w
∗(n−m)] z−m. Assume the input spectral density function Sss(z) is known,
then the amplitude of the channel can be identified but the phase information of H(z) is
96
missing. In order to obtain the full information of the channel, HOS of y(n) is employed in
many blind algorithms (e.g., 4-th order) [82].
Another powerful technique for blind channel estimation is ML Method [83]. In general,
consider the case of single input multiple output (SIMO) system. Consider a mathematical
model where the input and the output are discrete, the system operator H is linear and
shift invariant, the system is driven by a single-input sequence s(k) and yields M output
sequences y1(k), y2(k), · · · , yM (k), and the system has finite impulse responses (FIRs) hi(k),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,M , k = 0, 1, · · · , L, and L is the filter length. Such a system model can be
described as follows (in the absence of noise):
y1(k) = s(k) ∗ h1(k)
y2(k) = s(k) ∗ h2(k)
...
yM (k) = s(k) ∗ hM (k)
(4.163)
All channel outputs can be stacked into a single vector as follows
y =
[
yT1 y
T
2 · · · yTM
]T
(4.164)
with
yi = [yi(0) yi(1) · · · yi(N − 1)]T (4.165)
where N is the number of output samples from each channel and “T ” denotes the transpose.
Accordingly, and after including the noise, (4.163) can be written as
y = HMs+w (4.166)
where s is the input vector and it is given by
s = [s(−L) s(−L+ 1) · · · s(N − 1)]T (4.167)
and w is an additive circular white Gaussian noise vector. HM is known as a generalized
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Sylvester matrix and it is given by
HM =

H(1)
H(2)
...
H(M)

(4.168)
where H(1) is the N × (N + L) Sylvester matrix of the i-th channel response
H(i) =

hi(L) · · · hi(0) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 · · · hi(L) · · · hi(0)
 (4.169)
The PDF of y is given by
p(y) =
1
πNσ2N
exp
(
− 1
σ2
||y−HMs||2
)
(4.170)
where σ2 is the variance of each complex element of w, and || · || denotes two-norm. The ML
estimates of HM and s are given by those arguments that maximize the PDF , i.e.,
(HM , s)ML =argmax
HM ,s
p(y)
= argmin
HM ,s
||y−HMs||2 (4.171)
For any givenHM , the ML estimate of s that minimizes the quadratic function ||y−HMs||2
is known to be
sML =
(
HHMHM
)−1
HHMy (4.172)
where “H” denotes the conjugate transpose. Substituting from (4.172) into (4.171) yields
(HM )ML = argmin
HM
||(I−PH)y||2 (4.173)
where PH is the orthogonal projection matrix onto the range of HM , i.e.,
PH = HM
(
HHMHM
)−1
HHM (4.174)
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Although the minimization in (4.173) is computationally much more efficient than that
in (4.171), it is still highly nonlinear. Therefore, the computation of (4.173) has to be iterative
in nature. Many iterative optimization approaches such as [84, 85] can be applied to com-
pute (4.173). For the case when the system is modeled by yr =
√
Erd
−m
r hrp + nr, the same
solution can be found by setting L = 1 and M = 1.
4.10 Decoding Error Probability in The Case of K Sources
In this section we drive union bound on the decoding error probability for the MAP decoder
with P (z) when the network is compose of K sources, single relay, and single destination. In
this case, the decoder codebook consists of 2K+1. The codebook can be divided into two sets
such that all codewords in the same set are equaprobable. Let A be the set of codewords which
contains the “all-zeros” codeword and B be the other set. Therefore, the probability of any
codeword in the set A, ca, is P (ca) = P (z = +1)/(2
K) and that of any codeword in the set
B, cb, is P (cb) = P (z = −1)/(2K). We notice that all codewords in the set A will have even
weights and those in the set B will have odd weights. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all-zeros codeword was transmitted. The union bound in the decoding error probability
can be written as
PE ≤
K+1∑
m=1
(
K + 1
m
)
Pm (4.175)
where Pm = {P (ci → cj) such that ci differs from cj in m bits }. Since Pm decreases as m
increases, we only consider the contribution of P1 and P2. Hence,
PE ≤K + 1
2
[
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
]
e
−L(z)
2
(1+
√
1+ 1
γ
)
+
K(K + 1)
4
[
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
]2(
1 +
1
2
√
γ
1 + γ
)
(4.176)
4.11 Results and discussions
For the results shown in section, we assume that all source and relay nodes have an equal
receive signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR).
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Figure 4.5 Bit error probability vs Eb/N0 for P (z = −1) = 0.01
Figure 4.5 shows the simulation results of the bit error probability against the receive SNR
Eb/N0 for the discussed decoding schemes when P (z = −1) = 0.01. We see that there is an
error floor in the case of ignorant receiver. This result matches with the union bound of (4.55).
We also see that the error probability of proposed decoder falls in the rate of −1 i.e. diversity
order = 1. That is because the false alarm and miss detection of the misbehaving activity of
the relay node. This effect shows up in the second term of the right-hand side of (4.83). We
also see that both MAP decoder and Genie-aided decoder provide a diversity order 2. There is
about 4dB performance loss even with the use of MAP decoder. That because of the falsified
data injection at the relay node.
Figure 4.6 shows the simulation results of the bit error probability against the receive SNR
Eb/N0 when P (z = −1) = 0.99. We see that the error floor of the ignorant receiver occurs
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Figure 4.6 Bit error probability vs Eb/N0 for P (z = −1) = 0.99
at higher value. That because P (z = −1) was increased. Figure 4.7 shows the simulation
results of the bit error probability against the receive SNR Eb/N0 when P (z = −1) = 0.5.
This figure shows the wrest case where the performance of the proposed decoder and the MAP
decoder coincides. Figure 4.8 compares the union bounds on the decoding error probability
of the proposed decoding schemes with the simulation results. We see that there is about 3
dB difference between the upper bound and the exact error probability found by simulations.
Figure 4.9 shows the average probability of false alarm against Eb/N0 where Eb is the
receive energy per the source bit. In this figure, we assume that the receive energy of the relay
bit is as twice as that of the source bit. The number of formation bits is 45 bits. The number
of parity bits used in the case of channel coding aided MAP and the number of tracing bits
used in the case of tracing bit aided MAP are equal and this number is t = 18 bits. The
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Figure 4.7 Bit error probability vs Eb/N0 for P (z = −1) = 0.5
total number of bits per source is n = 63. For BCH code, the number of errors that can be
corrected is 3 errors. We notice that the probability of false alarm for both tracing bit and
channel coding aided MAP is less than that of the basic MAP at any SNR value. We also
notice that channel coding aided MAP outperforms the tracing bit aided MAP at high SNR
regime. That is because at high SNR regime the probability of error is small and the channel
code can correct all channel errors. Therefore all bits from the source seem to be tracing bits,
i.e. t = 63. However, in the tracing bit aided MAP case the number of tracing bits is fixed,
i.e. t = 18.
Figure 4.10 shows the probability of false alarm against Eb/N0 when the destination is
equipped with two antennas. We notice that PFA falls in the rate of −2 i.e. diversity order
= 2. Hence, there is a about 15 dB SNR gain over the single antenna case when PFA = 10
−3
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Figure 4.8 Comparing the union bounds on the decoding error probability
with simulations results.
Figure 4.11 shows the probability of false alarm against Eb/N0 In the case of M -ary mod-
ulation. The SNR γ in (4.159) is related to Eb/N0 as follows
γ =
K
N
Eb
N0
log2(M) (4.177)
where K is the number of source nodes and N−K is the number of relay nodes. For the system
model we considered in this section and for 4-ary modulation, the SNR is γ = 4Eb/3N0. We
notice that the probability of false alarm falls with diversity order 1. The techniques proposed
in Section 4.7 such as tracing bits, error correcting codes, and multiple antennas can be used
in order to enhance the performance of the MAP decoder. We also notice that the theoretical
results matches with the simulation results except for the region below 10 dB. That is because
the aproximation in (4.158) holds only at high SNR.
In order to study the effect of channel estimation error in the relay-destination link on the
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decoding error probability , we assume that the estimation error he is a complex Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and variance σ2e . Hence, the estimated channel gain between
the relay and the destination is given by
hrest = hr + he (4.178)
where hr is the actual channel gain and it follows a complex Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and variance σ2h. Figure 4.12 shows the simulation results for the bits error probability
against Eb/N0 when K = 2, P (z = −1) = 0.005, σ2e/σ2h = 5%. We see that there is about 1 dB
SNR loss at 3×10−4 error rate because of the channel estimation error. Figure 4.13 shows the
simulation results of the bit error probability against Eb/N0 when K = 2, P (z = −1) = 0.005,
σ2e/σ
2
h = 20%. We see that there is about 5 dB SNR loss at 3 × 10−4 error rate because
of the channel estimation error. We notice that the SNR loss increases as the variance of
the estimation error increases. Figure 4.14 shows the union bound on the decoding error
probability of (4.176) vs the number of users K. We notice that the decoding error probability
union bound increases as the number of users increases.
4.12 Conclusions
We proposed the MAP approach in detecting the misbehaving relay that injects false data
or adds channel errors into the network encoder in multi-access relay networks. The proposed
scheme does not require sending extra bits at the source, such as hash function or message
authentication check bits, hence there is no transmission overhead. In addition, it makes
an instantaneous decision about whether a relay node is behaving properly without a long-
term observation. The side information regarding the presence of forwarding misbehavior
is exploited at the probability of bit error, taking into account the lossy nature of wireless
links. We found that the proposed decoder and the MAP decoder with the aid of the MAP
detection are effective in mitigating the forwarding misbehaviors in multiple access networks
with network coding.
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CHAPTER 5. Delay Analysis in Message Ferrying System
Message Ferrying is a network paradigm in which a moving node or relay is used to transfer
messages between sparsely deployed and further separated nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. In
this paradigm, the moving relay - also called message ferry (MF)- stores, carries, and forwards
the messages. This paper analyzes the total delay time in transferring the message between
source and destination nodes taking into account the effect of channel fading, path loss, and
forward error correction. The performance gain in terms of delay and energy provided by
moving relay over static relay and the optimal locations of the moving relay that minimize the
total delay are determined. Both simulations and analytical calculations are provided.
5.1 Introduction
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an independent collection of mobile nodes that commu-
nicate without a pre-existing infrastructure [74]. MANETs are proposed to meet the require-
ments of the next generation of wireless communication systems. One of these requirements
is the rapid deployment of mobile users. Another characteristic of MANET’s is a resource
limitation in terms of power and bandwidth, which requires an efficient routing protocols [75].
Several routing protocols have been proposed [76]- [77]. These protocols assume that all nodes
are reachable and the network is fully connected.
There are several reasons that cause network partitioning (i.e., nodes are not reachable),
such as mobility of nodes, limited radio range, weather conditions, and physical obstacles.
In this case, the traditional “store and forward” paradigm is not possible in delivering the
message. “Store, hold, and forward” paradigm was proposed to cope with this problem [78].
In this paradigm, nodes store and hold packets even when a route does not exist. Later, the
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Figure 5.1 Source, destination, and relay locations.
packet may be passed to another node that has recently come into range. Zhao and Ammar
presented another scheme called message ferrying [79]. In Message Ferrying scheme, a moving
relay or Message Ferry (MF) follows a “store, carry, and forward” paradigm by accomplishing
consecutive events: 1) moves toward the transmitting node, 2) waits until it receives the
message, 3) moves toward the receiving node, 4) waits until it delivers the message. Although
some routing algorithms have been proposed [79]- [80], the design of the MF route is still an
open research topic.
In this paper, we investigate the trade-off between the two types of delay: 1) the delay
involved in moving the relay toward the source and the destination and 2) the delay involved
in correctly receiving the packet at the relay and the destination which depends on the location
of the moving relay node. Our goal is to find the optimal location of the relay that minimizes
the total delay, taking into account the effect of channel fading, path loss, and forward error
correction (FEC). We analyze the performance gain in terms of delay and energy that can be
provided by message ferrying in various scenarios and the optimal code rate that minimizes
the delay.
The system model is described in Section 5.2. Delay calculations and the optimal location of
the relay that minimizes the total delay are presented in Section 5.3 and Section 5.5 respectively.
Section 5.4 presents numerical results. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.6.
5.2 System Model
The system model is shown in Figure 5.1, where the source S and the destination D are
L meters apart. The relay R is initially located at the midpoint between S and D (i.e., L/2
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meters far from S and D). First, the relay moves d1 meters toward S with velocity v m/s and
stays at point A until it correctly receives the message. Then, it moves toward D by d1 + d2
meters with the same velocity v m/s and stays at point B until the message is correctly received
by the destination. The total delay time τ is then given by:
τ =
d1
v
+ τSR +
d1 + d2
v
+ τRD (5.1)
where τSR and τRD are the time for delivering the message from the source to the relay and
that from the relay to the destination, respectively.
We assume that the message consists of NP packets or code words and each code word is
of length n bits in which k bits are information bits. The channel is modeled as slow Rayleigh
fading with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) having power spectral density of No/2.
We assume that BPSK modulation and BCH codes are used.
5.3 Delay
The average received SNR at point A, γ¯SR is given by
γ¯SR =
d−mSR PS
RNo
(5.2)
where PS is the transmitted power of the source, R is the data rate (bits/s), m is the path
loss exponent, and dSR is the distance between the source and the relay. The probability of
bit error at point A is given by
PbSR =
1
2
[
1−
√
γ¯SR
1 + γ¯SR
]
(5.3)
≈ 1
4γ¯SR
(5.4)
If we assume the use of forward error correction (FEC) that corrects up to t errors, then the
word error rate WER, PESR is given by
PESR =
n∑
i=t+1
(
n
i
)
P ibSR (1− PbSR)n−i (5.5)
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The average number of transmissions from S to R before the message is correctly received by
the relay is given by
NSR =
∞∑
i=1
iP i−1ESR (1− PESR) (5.6)
=
1
1− PESR
(5.7)
and the time required to transmit one packet is n/R. Hence, the time delay in correctly
receiving NP packets by the relay is given by
τSR = NP
n
R (1− PESR)
(5.8)
Similarly, the average received SNR at the destination receiver is given by
γ¯RD =
d−mRDPR
RNo
(5.9)
where PR is the transmitted power of the relay and dRD is the distance between the relay and
the destination. The probability of bit error at D is given by
PbRD =
1
2
[
1−
√
γ¯RD
1 + ¯γRD
]
(5.10)
≈ 1
4γ¯RD
(5.11)
Hence, the time delay in correctly receiving NP packets by the destination node is given by
τRD = NP
n
R (1− PERD)
(5.12)
where PERD can be calculated from (5.5) with replacing PbSR by PbRD . Substituting from (5.8)
and (5.12) into (5.1) yields
τ =
2d1
v
+
NPn
R (1− PESR)
+
d2
v
+
NPn
R (1− PERD)
(5.13)
Now, we want to find d1 and d2 that minimize the total delay τ . Since the first two terms
of (5.13) depend only on d1 and the remaining two terms depend only on d2, the minimization
of τ is achieved by minimizing
τ1 =
2d1
v
+
NPn
R (1− PESR)
(5.14)
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with respect to d1 and minimizing
τ2 =
d2
v
+
NPn
R (1− PERD)
(5.15)
with respect to d2.
5.4 Optimal Relay Location
In high SNR, the probability of bit error in (5.4) is small and therefore the WER in (5.5)
can be approximated by
PESR ≈
(
n
t+ 1
)
P t+1bSR (5.16)
Substituting (5.4) into (5.16) yields
PESR ≈
(
n
t+ 1
)(
RNo
4PS
)t+1
d
m(t+1)
SR (5.17)
= β1
(
L
2
− d1
)m(t+1)
(5.18)
where dSR = L/2 − d1 and β1 =
(
n
t+1
) (
RNo
4PS
)t+1
and it will be small in high SNR regime.
Substitute (5.17) into (5.14) yields
τ1 ≈ 2d1
v
+NP
n
R
(
1− β1
(
L
2
− d1
)m(t+1))−1
(5.19)
≈ 2d1
v
+NP
n
R
(
1 + β1
(
L
2
− d1
)m(t+1))
(5.20)
Differentiating (5.20) with respect to d1 and setting it to zero, yields
2
v
− NPnβ1m(t+ 1)
R
(
L
2
− d1opt
)m(t+1)−1
= 0 (5.21)
Hence, the optimal value of d1 that minimizes τ1 is given by
d1opt ≈
L
2
−
(
2R
vNPnβ1m(t+ 1)
)1/(m(t+1)−1)
(5.22)
Similarly, the optimal value of d2 that minimizes τ2 is
d2opt ≈
L
2
−
(
R
vNPnβ2m(t+ 1)
)1/(m(t+1)−1)
(5.23)
where β2 =
(
n
t+1
) (
RNo
4PR
)t+1
.
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5.5 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we present numerical values of d1 and d2 that minimize delays τ1 and
τ2 in (5.14) and (5.15). When the relay is located at the middle point O, we assume that
γ¯SR = γ¯RD = γ¯i. We assume BCH code of code rate RC = k/n where k is the number of
information bits per packet. In other words, there are n − k parity bits within each packets.
Hence, the number of packets NP is q/k where q is the total data size. The code rate RC is
chosen to minimize the total delay in both cases of mobility and no-mobility. To calculate the
optimal code rate, we choose n (e.g., n = 63) and for each possible value of k, we find the
corresponding value of t and calculate NP . Fixing all other parameters and for each pair t and
NP , we calculate the minimum delay τmin and the value of RC corresponding to the minimum
τmin is chosen. We define two performance measures:
1. Delay Gain
The delay gain Gτ is defined as the difference between the delay when the relay is located
at O and the minimum delay provided by message ferrying.
2. Energy Gain
The energy gain GE (or energy saving) is defined as the difference between the transmis-
sion energy when the relay is fixed at middle point O and that when the relay is moved
to the position where the total delay is minimized. The energy per coded bit Es is Noγ¯SR
and the noise PSD No is given by
No = 2KT (5.24)
where K is the Boltzmann constant and T is the absolute temperature.
• Experiment 1
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the delays τ1 and τ2 versus the distances d1 and d2, respectively.
The parameters used in this experiment are provided in Table 5.1. Optimal values of d1, d2,
SNR, and WER at which the minimum delay is achieved are listed in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 Delay versus d1: parameters are listed in Table 5.1.
• Experiment 2
In this experiment, we increase the velocity of the relay to 100 Km/h. Results for this experi-
ment are listed in Table 5.3.
It is notable that increasing the relay velocity increases the optimal values of d1 and d2 and
consequently the optimal values of SNR which reduce the WER.
In experiment 2, (5.22) and (5.23) yields d1opt = 1.9 Km and d2opt = 2 Km and the
corresponding values of τ1 and τ2 are 3.97 min and 2.84 min respectively, and the total delay is
6.81 min. Comparing with those values in Table 5.3 indicates that (5.22) and (5.23) are fairly
close. Using parameters of experiment 1, the total delay is 14.35 min which is not that close
to the value in Table 5.2 because the optimal SNR is lower.
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Figure 5.3 Delay versus d2: parameters are listed in Table 5.1.
5.6 Conclusion
In this study we have investigated the optimal locations of the relay in the “ store, carry,
and forward” paradigm. Optimal locations are calculated to minimize the total delay. We
presented an analytical method for finding the optimal locations of the relay and the total
delay. Results show that the analytical method provides an accurate estimate of the total
delay and the optimal location of the relay.
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Table 5.1 Parameters used in experiment 1
D v R q n m γ¯bi
8 Km 30 Km/h 1200 bps 10KB 63 4 -1 dB
Table 5.2 Results of experiment 1
d1 d2 γ¯SR γ¯RD τ1min τ2min τmin Gτ GE
(m) (m) (dB) (dB) (min) (min) (min) (min) (Joule)
904.52 1085.43 3.45 4.50 6.97 5 11.96 2 0.98
Table 5.3 Results of experiment 2
d1 d2 γ¯SR γ¯RD τ1min τ2min τmin Gτ GE
(Km) (Km) (dB) (dB) (min) (min) (min) (min) (Joule)
1.69 1.85 8.53 9.78 3.88 2.82 6.70 7.32 1.31
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this research, we investigated four problems related to security, prioritized relaying,
message ferrying in wireless relay network. In the first problem, we investigated the tradeoff
between tracing bits and parity bits, where the former is to identify the malicious relay nodes
and discard (erase) the bits received from them and the latter is to correct the errors caused
by channel impairments such as fading and noise. We found that there exists an optimal
allocation of redundancy between tracing bits and parity bits that minimizes the probability
of decoding error or maximizing the throughput. When the total amount of redundancy (sum
of tracing bits and parity bits) is fixed, more redundancy should be allocated to the tracing
bits for higher P (H1) and less on the tracing bits for lower SNR. We analyzed the energy gain
(saving) and the throughput gain provided by the optimal redundancy allocation in a multiple
access relay network under falsified data injection attack.
In the second problem, we proposed prioritized analog relaying schemes that provide dif-
ferent SINR’s to different sources in multiple access relay networks. The proposed prioritized
relaying schemes enable the source with a higher priority level to send data with a higher rate
and/or a lower error probability while being relayed with other source at the same time in the
same bandwidth. We presented prioritized relaying methodologies and derived the required
number of relays as a function of the number of antennas per relay and the degree of cooper-
ation among relays. Our simulation results indicate that the proposed relaying methodologies
can indeed achieve the prescribed set of prioritization among sources.
In the third problem, we proposed the MAP approach in detecting the misbehaving relay
that injects false data or adds channel errors into the network encoder in multi-access relay
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networks. The proposed scheme does not require sending extra bits at the source, such as hash
function or message authentication check bits, hence there is no transmission overhead. In
addition, it makes an instantaneous decision about whether a relay node is behaving properly
without a long-term observation. The side information regarding the presence of forwarding
misbehavior is exploited at the probability of bit error, taking into account the lossy nature
of wireless links. We found that the proposed decoder and the MAP decoder with the aid of
the MAP detection are effective in mitigating the forwarding misbehaviors in multiple access
networks with network coding.
In the fourth problem, we investigated the optimal locations of the relay in the “ store,
carry, and forward” paradigm. Optimal locations are calculated to minimize the total delay.
We presented an analytical method for finding the optimal locations of the relay and the total
delay. Results show that the analytical method provides an accurate estimate of the total
delay and the optimal location of the relay.
6.2 Future Work
As an extension to the work we have done in this thesis, we are planning to address three
problems in the future. In Section 4.5.3, we proposed a method to find P (z) which is required
to decode the sources’ bits in the case of MAP decoder with P (z). The accuracy of estimating
P (z) increases as the averaging window length L increases which results in a more accurate
decoding and, accordingly, the decoding error probability will decrease. In the first problem,
we will analyze and study the effect of L on the decoding error probability. In the second
problem, we need to drive the the union bound on the decoding error probability in the case of
M -ary modulation. In The third problem, we will study the effect of probability of false alarm
and miss-detection on the decoding error probability. We also need to differnetiate between
the effect of P (f = −1) and P (z = −1) on the decoding error probability.
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APPENDIX A. Proof of SNR ordering
In this Appendix we show that γn ≥ γm if and only if Pn ≥ Pm. Let
c1 = Esq
2E
[
1/Tr
(
AA†
)]
and c2 = E
[
w†w
]
. Then
γn =
c1Pn
c1
∑N
i=1 Pi − c1Pn + c2
=
c1Pn
c3 − c1Pn (A.1)
where c3 = c1
∑N
i=1 Pi + c2. If γn ≥ γm, then
Pn
c3 − c1Pn ≥
Pm
c3 − c1Pm (A.2)
Therefore, Pn ≥ Pm.
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APPENDIX B. Proof of (4.94)
In this Appendix we prove (4.94). (4.92) can be written as
P (c0 → c4|h) = 1
2
erf
(√
X +
b√
X
)
(B.1)
where X = h23γ, b = 0.25 log (P (z = +1)/P (z = −1)), and erf is the error function which is
defined as
erf
(√
X +
b√
X
)
=
2√
π
∫ √X+ b√
X
0
e−t
2
dt (B.2)
The probability distribution function of X is given by
fX(x) =
1
γ
e−x/γ (B.3)
Averaging (B.1) over the distribution of x yields
P1 =
1
2γ
∫ ∞
0
erf
(√
x+
b√
x
)
e−x/γdx (B.4)
In what follows, we use the following formulas
erfc
(√
x+
b√
x
)
=
2√
π
∫ ∞
√
x+ b√
x
e−t
2
dt (B.5)
d
dx
erfc
(√
x+
b√
x
)
=
−1√
πx
(
1− b
x
)
e−
(x+c)2
x (B.6)
d
dx
erfc
(√
x+
b√
x
)
=
1√
πx
(
1− b
x
)
e−
(x+c)2
x (B.7)
Integrating (B.4) using integration by parts yields
P1 =
1
2γ
[
−γerfc
(√
x+
b√
x
)
e−x/γ
− γ√
π
∫
1√
x
(
1− b
x
)
e−x/γ−(x+b)
2/xdx
]∞
0
=
−1
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
x
(
1− b
x
)
e−x/γ−(x+b)
2/xdx (B.8)
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After some mathematical manipulations, (B.8) can be written as
P1 =
−e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
(√
γ
1 + γ
− d
u
)
e−
(u+d)2
u du (B.9)
where r = 2b(1 −
√
1 + 1/γ), d = b
√
1 + 1/γ, and u = x(1 + 1/γ). We can write (B.9) as
follows
P1 =
−e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
(
−1 +
√
γ
1 + γ
+ 1− d
u
)
e−
(u+d)2
u du
=
−e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
(
1− d
u
)
e−
(u+d)2
u du
+
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
e−
(u+d)2
u du
=
−e−r
2
[
erf
(√
u+
d√
u
)]∞
0
+
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
e−
(u+d)2
u du
=
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−r
2
√
π
∫ ∞
0
1√
u
e−
(u+d)2
u du (B.10)
By changing variables, let y =
√
u and dy = dy/(2
√
u). After substitution in (B.10) we
have
P1 =
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−r√
π
∫ ∞
0
e
−
(
y+d
y
)2
dy
=
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−(2d+r)√
π
∫ ∞
0
e
−
(
−y2− d2
y2
)
dy (B.11)
Using integration tables to find the integral in (B.11) yields
P1 =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
)
e−4d−r (B.12)
After substituting for the d and r, we have
P1 =
1
2
[
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
](
P (z = −1)
P (z = +1)
) 1
2
(1+
√
1+ 1
γ
)
(B.13)
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